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The cardiac surgical operating room (OR) is a complex environment in which highly trained subspecialists inter-
act with each other using sophisticated equipment to care for 
patients with severe cardiac disease and significant comorbidi-
ties. Thousands of patient lives have been saved or significantly 
improved with the advent of modern cardiac surgery. Indeed, 
both mortality and morbidity for coronary artery bypass 
surgery have decreased during the past decade (Figure 1).1 
Nonetheless, the highly skilled and dedicated personnel in 
cardiac ORs are human and will make errors. In 1991, Leape 
and colleagues2,3 estimated that among the 2 million patients 
hospitalized in New York in 1984, there were 27 179 adverse 
events that involved negligence; other evidence suggests that 
up to 16% of hospital inpatients are harmed.4 Gawande and 
associates5 found that the incidence of surgical adverse events 
was 12% among cardiac surgery patients versus 3% in other 
surgical patients; 54% of the adverse events were considered 
preventable. Of the roughly 350 000 to 500 000 patients who 
undergo cardiac surgery each year, 28 000 will have an adverse 
event, and one third of deaths associated with coronary artery 
bypass graft (CABG) operations may be preventable.6
Refined techniques, advanced technologies, and enhanced 
coordination of care have led to significant improvements in 
cardiac surgery outcomes. However, more than 10 years after 
the Institute of Medicine report,7 there is little evidence that 
much progress has been achieved in reducing or preventing 
errors.8 The tools to measure potential risks and interventions 
to improve patient safety are still in the early stages of devel-
opment and testing,9 and funding for patient safety studies 
remains inadequate. Published studies provide only limited 
evidence of improved outcomes.8,9 Furthermore, much of the 
existing research is, by necessity, qualitative and descriptive 
and thus does not lend itself to traditional quantitative statis-
tical analysis. Therefore, many clinicians are not conversant 
with such research.
Preventable errors are often not related to failure of techni-
cal skill, training, or knowledge but represent cognitive, sys-
tem, or teamwork failures (Figure 2).10–14 Nontechnical skills 
such as communication, cooperation, coordination, and lead-
ership are critical components of teamwork, but limited inter-
personal skills often underlie adverse events and errors.15–17 
In a review of litigated surgical outcomes, communication 
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failures accounted for 87% of the system failures that led to an 
indemnity payment.18 The communication failures occurred 
primarily between caregivers, rather than between caregiver 
and patient.
Breakdowns in teamwork that lead to surgical flow or oper-
ative disruptions are exceedingly common, having been noted 
at a rate of 17.4 per hour in one cardiac surgery study19 and at 
11 per case in another.20 Importantly, such disruptions add up, 
leading to technical errors and adverse patient outcomes.21–23 
The majority of flow disruptions are related to teamwork fail-
ures, and these disruptions have been shown to be strongly 
predictive of surgical errors.20
Even minor events in cardiac surgical procedures, that is, 
those not expected to affect outcome, reduce the team’s ability 
Figure 1. Change in mortality and 
stroke rates in patients undergoing 
isolated coronary artery bypass graft 
(CABG) surgery, 2000 to 2009. There 
was a 24.4% and 26.4% reduction 
in the unadjusted observed operative 
mortality (2.4% vs 1.9%) and stroke rates 
(1.6% vs 1.2%), respectively, during the 
course of the study period. Reprinted 
from ElBardissi et al1 with permission 
from Elsevier. Copyright © 2012, The 
American Association for Thoracic 
Surgery. 
Figure 2. Accident model. Active and 
latent failures in healthcare organizations, 
hospital management, and individual 
human error can all contribute to adverse 
events during high-risk procedures. 
Reprinted from Carthey et al13 with 
permission from Elsevier. Copyright © 
2001, The Society of Thoracic Surgeons. 
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to recover from major events and appear significantly associ-
ated with both death and near misses.22 In one study, for every 3 
minor problems above the mean of 9.9 per case, intraoperative 
performance was measurably reduced and operative duration 
increased.23 The accumulation of minor disruptions and events 
apparently reduced the ability of the cardiac team to compen-
sate for major errors24; in short, “little things matter.”17,25
Surgical team members vary in their awareness of their own 
and their colleagues’ teamwork skills. In multiple studies, self-
assessment of communication and teamwork skills by surgeons 
and anesthesiologists is disturbingly discordant with the opinions 
of their associated nursing and perfusion staff.26,27 Surgeons rated 
the teamwork of other surgeons as high/very high 85% of the 
time, but nurses rated their collaboration with surgeons as high/
very high only 48% of the time.28 Objective assessment of team-
work skill reveals differences between skill level of team mem-
bers and can indicate opportunity for education and training.29
The present scientific statement includes data regard-
ing many teamwork skills but focuses on communication. 
Communication failures were the leading root cause of 
65% of sentinel events reported by The Joint Commission 
between 2004 and 2012 and were a leading contributor to 
errors in medications, wrong-site procedures, and opera-
tive and postoperative events.30 In one cardiac surgery study, 
teamwork failures occurred frequently (5.4 per case with 
familiar teams and 15.4 per case with unfamiliar teams); 
communication issues were the primary cause of these team-
work failures (89%).21
The American Heart Association commissioned this scien-
tific statement to summarize the evidence regarding risks to 
patient safety and clarify interventions to reduce perioperative 
risks and human error in cardiac surgery. A comprehensive 
review of all potential risks to patient safety and tested inter-
ventions would be voluminous and could include wide-rang-
ing topics such as surgical techniques (mammary arteries in 
CABG surgery), various cardiopulmonary bypass (CPB) strat-
egies, or techniques to reduce infection or retained objects. 
We have chosen to focus primarily on those human, environ-
mental, and cultural factors that affect teamwork, particularly 
how cardiac surgery teams communicate within the OR and 
with other unit teams. The statement is organized to describe 
current knowledge about communication within and between 
teams, the physical work environment and how it influences 
teamwork (space, equipment, and ergonomics), and the orga-
nizational culture (safety climate and quality improvement 
[QI]) of the cardiac OR.
Our process was to focus on studies in the cardiac surgical 
environment regarding teamwork, but we did draw on other 
literature as needed to present critical concepts that were spe-
cifically lacking in the cardiac surgical literature. Although 
many cardiac surgery studies identify communication as a sig-
nificant source of error, discussion of the concepts that under-
lie effective or defective communication are found primarily 
in the cognitive psychology literature, and we have included 
these references in the “Communication and Teamwork” sec-
tion. Similarly, although our focus is on cardiac surgery, we 
have included pertinent data from other surgical disciplines. 
We have attempted to identify the references specific to car-
diac surgery, but the reader is encouraged to consult individual 
references for further information. Because of our focus, we 
excluded many dynamic areas of research that we hope will be 
summarized in other scientific statements or similar reviews. 
Finally, the present scientific statement aims to identify major 
knowledge gaps and potential areas for further research.
The present statement was coauthored by a writing commit-
tee composed of members of the American Heart Association’s 
Council on Cardiovascular Surgery and Anesthesia, as well as 
collaborating members of the following nonprofit organiza-
tions: the Society of Cardiovascular Anesthesiologists and its 
FOCUS (Flawless Operative Cardiovascular Unified Systems) 
initiative (Society of Cardiovascular Anesthesiologists Foun-
dation), the Society of Thoracic Surgeons, the Association 
of periOperative Registered Nurses, the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society, and the American Society of Extra-
corporeal Technology. We hope that these data and recom-
mendations will motivate further research to address the 
challenges of reducing human error and improving patient 
safety in the cardiac OR. Such research should be widely 
applicable to all ORs, as well as to interventional cardiology 
and electrophysiology procedural settings. In particular, we 
hope that the present scientific statement will encourage simi-
lar reviews of patient safety in cardiology catheterization and 
electrophysiology laboratories, as well as in other interven-
tional settings such as hybrid ORs designed for percutaneous 
management of valvular lesions, percutaneous assist devices, 
or stenting of aortic aneurysms.
Assessing Patient Safety
To understand how to improve patient safety, we must under-
stand how researchers have assessed nontechnical skills and 
their impact. To begin with, we need a common vocabulary; 
terms for nontechnical skills must be defined to promote reli-
able comparison of studies and discussion. Second, the effect 
of specific nontechnical skills on the reduction of human 
error or on patient safety must be quantified. Third, inter-
ventions to improve individual and team nontechnical skills 
must be designed and tested for efficacy. Fourth, the effect of 
improved nontechnical skill(s) on error reduction and, hope-
fully, ultimately on patient outcomes must be studied to dem-
onstrate progress.31
Technical skills can be measured objectively (eg, knots 
tied per minute), but nontechnical skills assessment requires 
observational and often seemingly subjective assessment by 
experts. Observational research, although new to many cli-
nicians, has already identified the number, type, and sever-
ity of adverse events that occur in the OR.13 Many team and 
individual behaviors that are precursors of adverse events, 
as well as the behaviors associated with surgical excellence, 
have been identified.12,32 Observational research, however, has 
limitations: Valid results require trained observers, and not all 
trainees will become expert.13,32,33 In one study, only 32% of 
all recorded events were captured by both observers, although 
events that were captured by both were rated equivalently.34
Teaching nontechnical skills is particularly challenging 
given the difficulty in assessing performance and provid-
ing feedback. Appropriate attention is paid to assessing the 
quality of technical skills, but nontechnical skills also require 
assessment for competency and to identify opportunities for 
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education. As noted, observational assessment of nontechnical 
skills requires trained and experienced observers; to date, use 
of trained observers has primarily been applied in research, 
not in training or certification of clinical competence. During 
surgical simulations, a strong correlation is found between the 
expert’s assessment and the resident surgeon’s self-assess-
ment of technical skills, but the same is not true for nontech-
nical skills.35 Senior surgeons’ self-assessments of technical 
skills highly correlate with that of an observer, but both junior 
and senior physician surgical trainees (resident and fellows), 
as well as surgical faculty, all rated themselves higher on their 
nontechnical skill level than did the expert observers.36
Objective observers are also necessary to accurately assess 
disruptions, errors, communication skills, and the impact of 
these factors on outcome. Unlike trained observers, OR per-
sonnel judged disruptions to affect their colleagues more than 
themselves; surgeons perceived fewer team disruptions than 
did other OR team members.37 Nontechnical skills may need 
to be explicitly taught, because senior surgeons may or may 
not demonstrate better teamwork skills than those more junior, 
particularly in simulated crisis scenarios.35,36,38
Teamwork Measures
Many nontechnical skill measurement tools have been used 
(Table 1), but there is no single accepted instrument. Many are 
designed to measure nontechnical skills within a specific sub-
team (nurses, surgeons, anesthesiologists).49 Behavior rating 
systems must be valid (measure what they purport to measure), 
reliable (have good intraobserver and interobserver correlation), 
sensitive (detect differences in behaviors when they exist), and 
feasible (be easy to implement and be cost-effective).
Five measurement tools, each with its own strengths and 
weaknesses, have been designed for surgical team and sub-
team skills49: the Observational Teamwork Assessment 
for Surgery (OTAS),29,33,39–44,49 the Oxford Non-technical 
Skills (NOTECHS),15,45–48 the Non-Technical Skills in 
Surgery (NOTSS),50–52 the Anesthesia Non-Technical Skills 
(ANTS),53,54 and the Scrub Practitioners’ Non-technical Skills 
(SPLINTS).54a,54b Of these 5, NOTSS, ANTS, and SPLINT are 
designed to assess the individual nontechnical skills of sur-
geons, anesthesiologists, and scrub practitioners respectively, 
whereas OTAS and NOTECHS are specifically designed 
to assess team behaviors and skills.55 The OTAS includes a 
task checklist and a team behaviors assessment. It has good 
construct validity (ie, it actually measures what it appears 
to measure) and strong reliability between expert observ-
ers but weak reliability between expert and novice observ-
ers, which indicates that training of observers is required.41 
The surgical NOTECHS was directly adapted from an avia-
tion NOTECHS scale45 and measures skills in 4 domains 
(cooperation/teamwork, leadership/management, situational 
awareness/vigilance, and problem solving/decision mak-
ing); some research teams have added communication/team 
skills.48 The NOTECHS has good reliability between expert 
and novice observers, has been used to show improvement in 
nontechnical skills after training, and has been used to show 
a significant inverse correlation between technical errors and 
nontechnical score.15,47 There is good correlation between the 
NOTECHS and OTAS scores when used in parallel47; both the 
OTAS and the modified NOTECHS have been found to be 
construct valid.47,56
Surgical flow disruptions are correlated with adverse events 
in several studies but are defined differently in each study.20,37,57 
Two tools have been proposed, namely, the Surgical Flow 
Disruption Tool (SFDT)57 and the Disruptions in Surgery 
Index (DiSI).37 Both have strong interrater reliability but have 
not been tested by other researchers.
Outcome Measures
Poor teamwork and poor nontechnical skills have been shown 
to adversely affect patient outcomes. Morbidity and mortality 
are associated with system failures,18 failures of coordination 
and communication,58 reported levels of communication,59 
poor teamwork behaviors,12 unfamiliarity among cardiac 
surgical team members,21,60 and the number of minor events 
(disruptions) per case.22 Other studies have linked teamwork 
quality and behaviors to surrogates such as increased length 
of operation,23 number of technical errors in an operation,46 
number of major errors,61 and stress levels of team members.62
The ultimate desired outcome for any safety intervention is 
reduction in morbidity and mortality. Mortality in cardiac sur-
gery is quite rare; thus, studies have to be very large to achieve 
adequate power to discern improvement in this measure. Neily 
and colleagues63 demonstrated a significant reduction in mor-
tality with teamwork training but included 189 000 procedures 
at 108 Veterans Affairs hospitals to reveal a treatment effect.
Because the safety climate of an institution correlates with 
communication errors, several studies have used changes in 
attitude toward safety or changes in team “emotional climate” 
as a surrogate of outcome to measure impact; these studies 
show training in nontechnical skills to be effective.64–70
Summary
1. The nontechnical skills of individuals and teams affect 
patient safety.
2. OTAS and NOTECHS have proven construct valid-
ity and reliability. Training of observers who use these 
Table 1. Teamwork Assessment Tools
Tools to Assess Teamwork 
Skills Within Team Definition
OTAS29,33,39–44 Procedural task checklist centered on patient,  











• Problem solving/decision making
• ± Communication/interaction
NOTECHS indicates Oxford Non-Technical Skills; and OTAS, Observational 
Teamwork Assessment for Surgery.
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instruments is strongly recommended for accurate 
results.
3. Proposed interventions to improve nontechnical skills 





Communication is “the exchange of information between a 
sender and a receiver.”71 In the OR, multiple individuals com-
municate simultaneously. Unfortunately, communication skill 
has been measured as the worst of 5 aspects of teamwork 
behavior in the OR29; deficits in patient safety are frequently 
a product of breakdowns or delays in communication.72,73 
Miscommunication can occur when the sender inaccurately 
encodes a message (eg, by using vague or incomplete lan-
guage), when the receiver decodes the sent information incor-
rectly, or when the information is given at the wrong time or 
received by the wrong individual.72 Communication failures 
are common72,74,75 and were the most common cause of prob-
lems in a host of studies.16,21–23,58,76 Miscommunication has 
been implicated as the root cause of error and adverse out-
comes in both general and cardiac surgery.13,18,20–22,59,77–80 It is 
worse when teams are unfamiliar with each other.21
Communication failures in the OR are equally related to 
timing, content (erroneous or missing data), purpose, and 
audience (directed to or received by the wrong person).72 
Effective communication is open, adaptable, accurate, and 
concise, and it is more likely to occur in supportive and safe 
climates.71 Open communication fosters seamless coordinated 
activities81; adaptable communication shows that team mem-
bers are aware of and adapt to others’ workloads, and concise 
communication promotes efficiency.82
The connection between effective communication and 
improved team performance/outcome has been shown in 
cockpit crews,83 navy teams,84 and surgical teams.81 A recent 
meta-analysis provided definitive evidence of the critical-
ity of information sharing for effective team performance.85 
Systematic literature reviews indicate that communication is 
a key feature of successful teams86 and is essential for high-
quality patient care.87 Good communication enables and facil-
itates other fundamental team processes and states, such as 
coordination, cooperation, cognition, coaching, and conflict 
resolution.88
Cooperation
Cooperation is a critical element of teamwork as well and 
captures the feelings, attitudes, and beliefs that drive behav-
ior. Attitudinal components began to be studied after several 
tragic aviation accidents were attributed to teamwork failures. 
Recognizing that the lack of teamwork skills (previously con-
sidered “nonessential”) created severe consequences, the avia-
tion industry developed and implemented CRM (ie, cockpit or 
crew resource management) programs to improve teamwork.89
Some of the most studied attitudes include collective effi-
cacy (a collective sense of competence),90,91 team orienta-
tion (a preference for and belief in teamwork),92,93 cohesion 
(a commitment to the team, its task, or both),94,95 and mutual 
trust (a shared belief that all will contribute to and protect the 
team).96,97 Although data from cardiac surgical teams are lack-
ing, other studies of dynamic, complex environments have 
shown that adaptive performance is critical. Psychological 
safety, team empowerment (the feeling that team members 
have the authority to control their work and environment), and 
safety climate are critical.98–101 Empirical research has shown 
that when teams have high levels of collective efficacy, mem-
bers exert more effort and take more strategic risks, which 
leads to better performance and higher satisfaction.102,103 The 
level of trust within a team affects how much members moni-
tor each other, how committed team members are to the orga-
nization, and performance.104–111
Coordination
Communication also enables the behavioral skills necessary for 
optimal coordination and team performance.112 Coordination 
requires effective communication and is essential for successful 
team performance. It is, essentially, “orchestrating the sequence 
and timing of interdependent actions.”113 Coordination can be 
established explicitly with synchronization and awareness or 
implicitly with covert sequencing and communication.71
Implicit coordination entails a shared understanding of 
the task, the environment, and individual roles and responsi-
bilities within the team. It allows members to anticipate each 
other’s actions and needs without explicit communication, 
which enhances efficiency.114–116A mutual team understanding 
allows team members to provide assistance, information, and 
feedback,71 which allows the team to modify structures and 
processes without detriment in performance.117 The ability to 
foresee is imperative for effective teamwork and performance, 
especially in high-stress situations.71 Without coordinated 
behaviors, team members cannot ensure that actions and tasks 
are performed in synchrony without wasted effort.112
For decades, research in the military and aviation has 
demonstrated that a team’s mutual understanding facilitates 
coordination and performance.114,115,120,121 Other studies show 
that teams with and without external pressures exhibit better 
performance when they have effective and efficient coordinat-
ing behaviors.122,123 Within medical teams, explicitly stating 
the team’s needs and goals or using team familiarity can build 
coordination skills and allow team members to develop clear 
expectations and understanding.71 Training in coordination 
and adaptation, providing information updates, and distribut-
ing responsibilities improves coordinating behaviors.115
Cognition
Cognition is a shared understanding that arises from team 
interactions,124 which improves with repeated interactions.125 
Cognition refers to the team’s collective knowledge about the 
roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of each member.82 The 
ability to anticipate team members’ needs enhances coordina-
tion and communication.126 A common understanding among 
team members enhances shared awareness of the surround-
ings, critical for problem solving in dynamic situations.117 
Teams lacking in shared understanding have reduced coordi-
nation, which leads to poor performance.125,127
Studies of team cognition in aviation and the military, as 
well as in laboratory studies with students, have shown that 
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experienced teams and teams familiar with one another have 
better team cognition (eg, shared mental model) and better 
outcomes than inexperienced teams.21,60,128–131 Shared knowl-
edge affects team behaviors and performance (reviewed 
by Mathieu et al132). Shared cognition improves team com-
munication,133–136 learning and self-regulation,126,137–140 and 
coordination.125–127
Within the medical domain, reflexivity training (ie, guided 
reflection of strategies used by the team),131,140 cross-training 
(ie, training on the tasks and duties of other members),126,141 
and simulation-based team training142,143 have been dis-
cussed as effective interventions to improve team cognition. 
Improving the understanding shared among team members 
enhances coordination and performance.
Conflict
Communication is pivotal for conflict resolution. Conflict, 
defined as discrepancies or incompatibilities among team 
members,144 can center on tasks, relationships, or pro-
cesses.145,146 Conflict has been found to occur during the treat-
ment of 50% to 75% of hospitalized patients,147,148 and this 
may be even greater in the OR, where ostensibly equal physi-
cian teams share in the care of a single patient.
Conflict can have positive or negative implications.149,150 
Task-based conflict improves group performance in the evalu-
ation of nonroutine problems and in group decision making,144 
but conflict also results in lower team member satisfaction, 
commitment,151 cohesion, and effectiveness.145 Unlike task-
based conflict, relationship conflict has a profound negative 
effect on both performance and satisfaction and decreases 
members’ willingness to remain part of the group.151–153
In the OR, conflicts are often poorly managed through 
avoidance, yielding, or competition, when collaboration and 
compromise would yield a better outcome.154 Collaboration 
and compromise are particularly difficult when there is status 
asymmetry, whereby one member has greater power or senior-
ity, such as physicians with nurses or an attending physician 
with residents.147,155 Among OR personnel, 73% opined that 
disagreements in the OR are resolved appropriately, but 29% 
stated they would have trouble speaking up if they perceived 
a problem with patient care, and 41% felt unable to express 
disagreement.156 Behaviors that physicians perceive as deci-
sive and necessary to achieve task goals may be viewed as 
harsh and demeaning by subordinates.157 Difficulty in seeing 
one’s own behavior as others see it is pervasive throughout 
OR and intensive care unit (ICU) teams.158,159 When watching 
videos of conflict scenarios, surgeons, anesthesiologists, and 
nurses rated the tension levels similarly but rated their own 
profession as having relatively less responsibility for creating 
or resolving the tension.160,161
There are well-known approaches to conflict resolution in 
the literature (eg, the 7-step model, principle-based conflict 
resolution, advocacy/inquiry).144,146,162,163 Teaching conflict 
management to OR teams is important and possible.157,163 
Effective techniques for conflict resolution are an important 
component of most team-training methods.63,164
Coaching
Team coaching, defined as “direct interaction with a 
team intended to help members make coordinated and 
task-appropriate use of their collective resources in accom-
plishing the team’s work,”165 can be used to improve the per-
formance of underperforming individuals and to enhance the 
skills of those who show promise as future high performers.166 
Coaching behaviors include identifying problems and leading 
consultations among the group members.132
Positive effects of coaching include better team member 
relationships, member satisfaction, team empowerment, and 
emotional security and safety.132 A strong relationship exists 
between leadership and both personal and team empowerment 
(ie, the sense of personal or team control and motivation to 
complete a task), and team empowerment enhances team per-
formance.167 Within health care, coaching has been shown to 
increase nursing innovations168 and reduce mortality.63
Leadership coaches can model desirable behaviors, pro-
vide constructive feedback to enhance team performance, and 
encourage open communication and speaking up.86 Although 
cardiac surgeons are often viewed as the primary leaders in 
cardiac surgical teams, other team members can provide lead-
ership and beneficial coaching to teammates. This intrateam 
coaching involves team members using constructive feed-
back to identify areas of poor performance and enhance task 
completion.112 Intrateam coaching involves such behaviors as 
“providing advice, suggestions, guidance and instructions, 
calling attention to potential error, and confronting members 
who break norms.”112 These coaching behaviors are beneficial 
only when team members are receptive to suggestions and 
constructive criticisms.112,169
Interventions to Reduce Errors
Within the hospital and OR, interventions designed to improve 
teamwork are team training and structured tools and protocols; 
interventions often fit more than 1 of these categories.170 These 
interventions lead to increased patient and staff satisfaction and 
reduced mortality.171–175 Standardization of critical interactions 
by use of protocols (eg, handoffs) improves the content and 
structure of information and increases participation21,77,176,177 
but is often met with ambivalence at best and hostility at 
worst.45,178 Physicians typically overrate their nontechnical 
skills; downplay the effects of stress, fatigue, and disruptions; 
and view the imposition of checklists or guidelines as limiting 
their ability to provide individualized patient care, or as an 
insult to their intelligence and skill.26,44,46,62,156,179,180 The impact 
of nontechnical skill training, checklists, briefings, simulation 
training, and structured communication protocols on aviation 
safety is undeniable; the evidence that these interventions can 
improve surgical care is increasing.181–185
In surgery, as in aviation, even the best of protocols and 
teamwork efforts will not totally eliminate errors or accidents 
(errors that reach the patient). As postulated by Perrow,186 
accidents are the norm in high-risk industries and cannot be 
totally eliminated even by the best of teams; only the time 
interval between accidents can be increased or decreased. 
Vannucci and colleagues187,188 described a series of 4 retained 
guidewires after central line insertion, 2 of which occurred 
after an extensive training program to eliminate retained 
guidewires; the operators who failed to remove the guidewires 
had successfully completed the training program. Therefore, 
continued review of adverse events will be required to 
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identify not just teamwork issues but system issues that can 
improve safety. Review of all of those techniques (root cause 
analysis, sentinel event capture, competency review of clini-
cians, etc) is beyond the scope of this statement but is critical 
to patient safety.
Team Training
The ample evidence that poor teamwork skills (communica-
tion, leadership, situational awareness) contribute to errors 
and adverse outcomes16,17,21–23,58,61,75 suggests that team-
work training to improve nontechnical skills should reduce 
errors.164,185 After the Institute of Medicine published “To Err 
Is Human,”7 the Institute studied the successful use of CRM to 
reduce error in aviation and recommended that team-training 
programs be implemented in critical care areas of medicine. 
Implementation of these recommendations has taken time; the 
CRM principles had to be adapted for use in medicine, team-
training methods had to be developed, and the results of team 
training had to be evaluated. Nonetheless, recent reviews have 
found that CRM-type strategies consistently increase desir-
able teamwork attitudes170 and improve teamwork practices 
and outcomes (eg, complication rates).189 Team perceptions 
of and attitudes toward patient safety are correlated with the 
quality of patient safety.185
An early report of the benefits of formal team training dem-
onstrated a significant improvement in the quality of emer-
gency department team behaviors and a reduction in clinical 
error rate from 31% to 4.4%.190 Halverson et al reported that a 
team-training curriculum, with 4 hours of classroom work and 
in situ coaching, increased the use of preoperative briefings191 
and reduced communication errors by half.74 Dedicated train-
ing sessions significantly improved communication compos-
ite scores in the OR.192
In a preintervention and postintervention observational 
study in vascular and general surgery, Oxford researchers 
implemented CRM-based teamwork training (9 hours of 
didactic and interactive teaching).45,46 Teamwork scores and 
teamwork climate scores improved, and technical and proce-
dural error rates were reduced.46 A national prospective study 
of the Veteran’s Administration Medical Team Training pro-
gram based on CRM principles193 showed an 18% reduction 
in annual mortality.63 There was a dose-response relationship 
between Medical Team Training and mortality: For every quar-
ter (3 months) of the team-training program, a reduction of 0.5 
deaths per 1000 operations was observed.63 Implementation of 
Medical Team Training program was also associated with a 
reduction in wrong-site surgery194 and improved compliance 
with best practices.195
Another national team-training effort is TeamSTEPPS, an 
evidence-based, resource-rich, government-sponsored pro-
gram (http://teamstepps.ahrq.gov/).196 Although TeamSTEPPS 
has been implemented in hundreds of facilities, few empiric 
studies have examined its impact on patient outcome. One 
recent study verified that this program of team training sig-
nificantly improved OR teamwork and communication scores, 
reduced surgical mortality and morbidity, increased OR effi-
ciency, and improved patient satisfaction.164 However, many of 
the initial gains were lost within 12 months, which indicates 
that sustained improvement may be difficult to achieve.164
Few data exist to define the components of effective team 
training. Training times range from a few hours197 to sev-
eral days,45,46,63 program content is variable, and sustaining 
improvement may be difficult.164 In one posttraining observa-
tional study, surgical teams that had undergone training were 
compliant with only 60% of the safety practices included in 
the program.198 In another such study, communication and 
team skills improved immediately but extinguished after 3 
months.197 However, the calculated threat-to-outcome score 
improved immediately and remained significantly improved 3 
months later.197 From the data available, it appears that teams 
should be trained as teams, not as individuals196; that use of 
simulated scenarios is effective196; that both executive leader-
ship and nurse managers are critical to effective implemen-
tation199; and that repetition, continued coaching, or both are 
required to strengthen and maintain benefits.197,198
Time-outs, Checklists, Briefings, and Debriefings
Timeouts, checklists, and briefings can reduce errors in com-
munication. Checklists and timeouts typically are close-ended, 
with specific information called out and verified, whereas brief-
ings are quick discussions guided by a structured but open-
ended checklist. Checklists are the same every time, covering 
the steps common to all procedures, whereas briefings should 
be different every time and focused on the unique aspects of 
the procedure. Briefings establish a dialogue and provide an 
opportunity for all OR personnel to “confirm details, exchange 
information, ask questions, and identify problems or con-
cerns.”178 Debriefings are intended to facilitate sharing of what 
was learned after a complex task has been completed and often 
include the questions, “What went right today?” and “What 
can we do to make sure tomorrow goes more smoothly?”
Timeouts were first proposed, and then mandated by The 
Joint Commission in 2003, to reduce wrong-site procedures. 
The Joint Commission universal protocol requires verification 
of the patient’s identity, marking of the operative site, and a 
“timeout” just before the operation or procedure.200
Checklists are simple cognitive tools that can improve the 
performance of both simple tasks (eg, shopping) and complex 
tasks (eg, flying an aircraft)201 and can be effective as remind-
ers of routine tasks that might otherwise be overlooked.202 The 
World Health Organization (WHO) developed and strongly 
advocates universal implementation of the “Surgical Safety 
Checklist,” a series of standardized timeouts at 3 times dur-
ing an operation: (1) before induction of anesthesia, (2) before 
skin incision, and (3) before the patient leaves the OR.171,203 It 
includes a comprehensive check of patient identity, site of sur-
gery, use of antibiotics and pulse oximetry, and drug allergies; 
its use has been shown to reduce mortality (Figure 3).171,204
Checklists can be used to identify critical steps in a com-
monly performed procedure such as laparoscopic cholecys-
tectomy,205 or to provide direction in rare, crisis situations. 
Ziewacz and colleagues206 identified 12 of the most frequently 
occurring OR crises and developed corresponding evidence-
based metrics of essential care for each crisis scenario (failed 
intubation, pulseless electrical activity, air embolus, malig-
nant hyperthermia, etc). The crisis checklist was studied ini-
tially by 2 surgical teams who managed 4 simulated crises 
with and without the checklist. Checklist use resulted in a 
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6-fold reduction in failure of adherence to critical steps.206 
Arriaga and colleagues207 recently studied management of 
simulated surgical crises with and without the checklist (17 
surgical teams and 106 simulations) and found that failure to 
provide lifesaving steps was significantly reduced with use of 
the checklist (6% of steps missed with use of the checklist 
versus 23% of steps missed without its use.
Checklists can also be used to drive implementation of best 
practices and to reduce voluminous guidelines to a simple 
set of the most critical evidence-based practices.208 Although 
checklists can improve outcomes, each must be simple, evi-
dence based, and grounded in the realities of the workplace.201 
Implementation of checklists has been shown to reduce the 
rates of central line infection and ventilator-associated pneu-
monia, as well as mortality.208–210
However, experts argue that it is the adaptive work of the 
team that generates improvements in patient safety rather than 
the technology of a checklist.211 If the checklist is imposed 
from above without a team-wide willingness to undergo the 
fundamental attitudinal change toward the behaviors outlined 
by the checklist, clinicians can feel that checklists undermine 
their authority, are infantilizing, and delay effective patient 
care.212,213 In the Netherlands, where the Dutch Health Care 
Inspectorate mandated implementation of the WHO checklist 
by 2008, complete implementation of the checklist occurred 
in only 39% of 11 151 cases. Overall mortality decreased from 
3.13% to 2.85%, but the reduction in mortality was strongly 
associated with checklist compliance.204
One of the most effective checklist implementation proj-
ects was the Michigan Keystone project to eliminate cathe-
ter-related bloodstream infections.208 Analysis of that project 
ascribed its success more to creation of a “densely networked 
community” with a shared mission to improve practice and 
the use of hard data to create discipline, rather than the simple 
presentation of a checklist to be followed.214
Briefings allow teams to develop a shared mental model of 
the work ahead and have been widely used by the military, 
commercial aviators, and longshoremen. A preoperative brief-
ing allows team members to share their knowledge and their 
particular concerns about the task ahead.179,215 In aviation, the 
cockpit briefing is critical to verify technical details, but a key 
nontechnical role is establishing that a team member who 
sees anything of concern must speak up.84 The pilot verbally 
affirms that all information regarding safety is welcome, even 
if it means questioning the pilot. In surgery, as was typical in 
pre-CRM aviation, a strict hierarchical framework can exist 
that inhibits lower-status team members from questioning 
someone with higher authority.216 As noted above, many OR 
personnel report that they would have trouble speaking up or 
expressing disagreement.156
Before team training or formal implementation, few if 
any briefings occur.217,218 Among the challenges in instituting 
briefings is the difference in opinion among caregivers as to 
what constitutes a briefing. Although 39% of surgeons in a 
United Kingdom practice survey stated they always perform 
briefings, only 4% of their nurses agreed.179 This was also the 
case when efforts were made to institute briefings in cardiac 
surgery at Mayo Clinic (unpublished observation, T.M.S.). In 
the Safe Surgery Checklist study of 3733 cases, few included 
preoperative briefings.171
One checklist, the Surgical Patient Safety System 
(SURPASS) checklist, includes a briefing and debriefing.182 A 
closed-claims review indicated that one third of the factors 
that contributed to adverse events could have been intercepted 
and nearly 40% of deaths might have been prevented by use 
of the SURPASS checklist with its imbedded briefings.219 
Implementation of SURPASS reduced complication rates 
from 27.3% to 16.7% and dropped in-hospital mortality from 
1.5% to 0.8%.183 Implementation of the WHO Surgical Safety 
Checklist, which contains many domains inherent in briefings, 
Surgical Safety Checklist
Has the patient confirmed his/her identity, 
site, procedure, and consent?
 Yes
Is the site marked?
 Yes 
 Not applicable
Is the anaesthesia machine and medication 
check complete? 
 Yes 
Is the pulse oximeter on the patient and 
functioning?
 Yes 




Difficult airway or aspiration risk?
 No
 Yes, and equipment/assistance available 
Risk of >500ml blood loss (7ml/kg in children)?
 No
 Yes, and two IVs/central access and fluids 
planned
 Confirm all team members have 
introduced themselves by name and role.
 Confirm the patient’s name, procedure, 
and where the incision will be made.
Has antibiotic prophylaxis been given within 





 What are the critical or non-routine steps?
 How long will the case take?
 What is the anticipated blood loss?
To Anaesthetist:
 Are there any patient-specific concerns?
To Nursing Team:
 Has sterility (including indicator results) 
 been confirmed?
 Are there equipment issues or any concerns?




 The name of the procedure
 Completion of instrument, sponge and needle 
counts
 Specimen labelling (read specimen labels aloud, 
including patient name)
 Whether there are any equipment problems to be 
addressed
To Surgeon, Anaesthetist and Nurse:
 What are the key concerns for recovery and 
management of this patient? 
This checklist is not intended to be comprehensive. Additions and modifications to fit local practice are encouraged.                       Revised 1 / 2009
(with at least nurse and anaesthetist) (with nurse, anaesthetist and surgeon) (with nurse, anaesthetist and surgeon)
© WHO, 2009
 Before induction of anaesthesia Before skin incision Before patient leaves operating room
Figure 3. World Health 
Organization Surgical Safety 
Checklist.201 IV indicates 
intravenous line. Reprinted 
from Reference 203 with 
permission of the publisher. 
Copyright © 2009, World 
Health Organization. All rights 
reserved.
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had nearly identical results, reducing mortality from 1.5% to 
0.8% and complications from 11.0% to 7.0%.171 This study 
included >3500 cases done at 8 institutions in 5 continents and 
included rudimentary to sophisticated procedures. In a recent 
study of 25 513 patients, van Klei and colleagues204 showed 
that implementation of the WHO checklist, including a preop-
erative briefing, resulted in a reduction of in-hospital 30-day 
mortality from 3.15% to 2.85% (odds ratio, 0.85; 95% confi-
dence interval, 0.73–0.98). The effect was driven by check-
list compliance: The odds ratio for improved outcome with 
full checklist completion was 0.44 (95% confidence interval, 
0.28–0.70), compared with 1.09 (95% confidence interval, 
0.78–1.52) and 1.16 (95% confidence interval, 0.86–1.56) for 
partial compliance or noncompliance, respectively.
Recently, the use of briefings was mandated as part of a 
larger teamwork training intervention in the Veterans Health 
Administration; mortality decreased by 18% after team train-
ing was implemented.63 In 2 other studies, compliance with 
antibiotic and deep venous thrombosis prophylaxis improved 
after the implementation of briefings and debriefings.195,220 
Briefings can reduce distractions and flow disruptions, which 
are a significant source of serious surgical error.20 Gillespie 
and colleagues,221 observing planned and unplanned surgeries, 
found an inverse correlation between the familiarity of a team 
and the number of miscommunications, as well as a positive 
correlation between number of interruptions in surgery and the 
number of miscommunications. Implementing a short, struc-
tured briefing halves the frequency of flow disruptions, lack of 
knowledge of the case, and miscommunications between staff 
even when instituted within a “familiar” team.222 Nurses made 
fewer trips to the sterile core for supplies, and spent less time 
there, whereas wastage was decreased.222 In another interven-
tion study, preoperative briefings decreased unexpected delays 
in surgery by 31%.68
In addition to improving patient outcome, briefings enhance 
teamwork climate, behaviors, and performance. In one survey, 
respondents who said that briefings are common reported a bet-
ter safety climate than respondents who reported no briefings.218 
Briefings are associated with perceptions of reduced risk and 
with enhanced collaboration.66 In one study,176 participants 
commented after the briefing, “Your opinions seem to matter. 
You feel more valued,” and, “Now people are willing to say 
when they are not happy. They are not worried about backlash 
anymore.” An Israeli study found that briefings reduced non-
routine events by 25% and that members “felt most valuable for 
their own work, the teamwork and patient safety.”217 In a United 
Kingdom study of briefings conducted over a 6-month period, 
staff members perceived that the team culture was improved, 
and potential problems were highlighted.223 O’Neill224 noted 
that leadership must create a culture wherein employees are 
treated with dignity and respect and that habitual excellence 
requires transparency and sharing of problems. Briefings and 
debriefings can provide the needed transparency and sharing.
Briefings do not prolong surgical procedures225 but shorten 
them by decreasing interruptions and distractions.222 In one 
study of >35 000 cases, the length of the briefing averaged 2.9 
minutes (range, 1–5 minutes).215
Despite the strong evidence supporting briefings, there 
are organizational and psychological factors that “constrain 
safety in the OR.”212 The tendency of physicians to misper-
ceive their nontechnical skills as better than they are may lead 
to the view that no improvement is needed.26,178,213 Not all sur-
geons agree that briefings improve teamwork, although sur-
geons who have instituted briefings report greater efficiency 
and increased team morale.179 Surgeons randomly assigned 
to a checklist intervention group performed more positive 
safety-related team behaviors than control surgeons but also 
reported lower levels of comfort, team efficiency, and com-
munication, which indicates that adapting to checklists or 
briefings may be uncomfortable initially.226 The role of facil-
ity and leadership and local champions is critical to effective 
implementation227 but insufficient by itself, because a wide 
range of responses (from acceptance to resistance) to briefings 
and debriefings can hinder their implementation and must be 
understood before effective implementation of these practices 
can occur.178,179,218
Debriefings have been less well studied, although some out-
come studies included debriefings, as did the large Veterans 
Health Administration study.63 The debriefing allows mem-
bers of the medical team to assess what went well and what 
did not, to coalesce as a team, and to improve their perfor-
mance in their next case.176 Debriefings provide teams the 
opportunity to formulate future plans, develop and implement 
system improvements, and address areas of communication 
weakness.215 Debriefing methods and implementation pro-
cesses have been described previously.228–230
In conclusion, a growing body of literature suggests that 
surgical briefings and debriefings can result in impressive 
reductions in morbidity and mortality. More research into 
impediments to implementation will be useful, but the evi-
dence to date supports case-by-case structured briefing and 
debriefings in cardiac surgery.
Simulation
In aviation, simulation training is widespread and is used to 
train individual skills, assess the technical and nontechnical 
skills of individuals and teams, and study how errors occur 
and how they can be prevented.89 Medicine has been slow to 
adopt simulation training, but the technical and educational 
tools and techniques that underpin high-fidelity simulation 
training in medicine are undergoing rapid evolution and devel-
opment.231,232 Simulators are emerging as a valuable tool for 
teaching procedural skills233–235 and measurement of skills.235 
Such assessment is becoming part of the licensure process in 
some areas of medicine.236,237
Simulators show promise for assessing and training per-
sonnel in nontechnical skills.36,128,238–240 Current patient simu-
lators provide highly realistic physiological data with real 
clinical equipment, presenting accurate and believable clini-
cal scenarios. This technology requires educators to design 
curricula and evaluation rubrics and to document the validity 
of the educational environment.241–244 Although much of the 
initial research focused on technical skill training and assess-
ment,36,38 recent evidence supports simulation for team train-
ing and the development of nontechnical skills.231,243,245,246
Simulation also allows the scientific testing, without expos-
ing a patient to risk, of the effect of human factors (eg, fatigue, 
stress) on technical skill,43,247,248 communication patterns 
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during crisis,240 testing of educational methods,249 and the 
relationship between technical and nontechnical skills35,250 or 
between teamwork and clinical performance.251
High-fidelity simulation may provide an optimal learning 
environment. This can be especially effective in crisis situ-
ation training, enabling individuals and teams to experience 
the cognitive challenge, stress, and physical demands of emer-
gencies without potential for patient injury. Catastrophic inci-
dents require the delivery of a complex, coordinated response 
by the team under time pressure, but they occur rarely and 
cannot be practiced in the “real world.”252 In the simulated 
OR, team communication and tactical responses to challeng-
ing clinical problems can be practiced, evaluated accurately, 
and measurably improved. In a now famous study of learn-
ing in mice, Yerkes and Dodson253 showed that learning was 
enhanced with moderate stimulation (arousal) but degraded 
with intense arousal.
Simulation is particularly suited for training in CPB emer-
gencies and was first described in 1977.254,255 Computer-
controlled hydraulic models of the adult and pediatric human 
circulation exist for training in CPB and can be configured 
to simulate routine or crisis scenarios.252,257 Virtually 100% 
of perfusionists surveyed in 2002 believed that such prac-
tice would be beneficial, but only 17% reported that such 
drills occur.258 In a recent study of education of whole car-
diac surgery teams in crisis management using high-fidelity 
simulation, participants reported 2 areas of highest priority 
and improvement: encouraging outspokenness about critical 
information and improved interprofessional communication 
by clearly defining the intended recipient (using the name of 
the person to whom communication is directed) and by atten-
tion to “closing the loop” in verbal communications.259
Structured Communication Protocols
Communication is improved by information exchange proto-
cols that facilitate presentation and recall260 and closed-loop 
communication to acknowledge receipt of information and 
verify content.261 Closed-loop communication is particularly 
important in stressful contexts and when the intended recipi-
ent is not clear.72,262 This style of communication ensures that 
the team has shared goals, expectations, situation awareness, 
and plan execution.117
Structured communication techniques, such as using words 
for letters (alpha, bravo, charlie) or saying the individual dig-
its of numbers (“one one” instead of “eleven,” which sounds 
like “seven”) can reduce ambiguity, enhance clarity, and spec-
ify the intended recipient. Read-backs, Situation-Background-
Assessment-Recommendation (SBAR), critical assertions, 
and advocacy/inquiry have been used effectively for decades 
by the armed forces and aviation to standardize information 
transfer, reduce information loss, and facilitate communica-
tion to superiors. Few data exist about effectiveness in medical 
settings. Nevertheless, structured communication protocols 
are commonly part of the core curriculum of team-training 
programs that are effective in reducing errors and mortal-
ity.63 Implementation of protocol-driven communication dur-
ing CPB reduces surgeon/perfusion communication errors by 
nearly 40%.263 Simulation-based studies of comprehensive 
team-training programs designed to measure communication 
skills have proved these interventions’ content validity,264 but 
rigorous studies of the effectiveness of communication train-
ing or structured communication protocols in cardiac surgery 
are lacking.
Communication Between Teams
The transfer of patients and patient information from one team 
to another, termed handoff or handover, is frequent in medicine. 
Handoff failures have been identified as a significant source 
of medical errors, both between and within teams.78,265–269  
The Joint Commission defines a handoff as a contemporane-
ous, interactive process of passing patient-specific informa-
tion from one caregiver to another to ensure the continuity 
and safety of patient care; standardized handoff communica-
tions was a patient safety goal for 2006 (goal 2E).270 Cardiac 
surgery patients are handed off many times: from cardiology 
(preprocedural testing, evaluation), to the surgeon and OR 
team, to the ICU team, to the ward team, and often back to the 
cardiology team for long-term follow-up and care.271
Gawande and colleagues analyzed surgical errors in closed 
claims at 4 malpractice insurance companies and provided 
results in 2 publications.78,268 In the 258 surgical malpractice 
cases in which an error led to patient injury, 60 cases involved 
communication failures and resulted in injury to patients.78,268 
Forty-three percent of the communication failures occurred 
during a handoff between providers, and 19% of these com-
munication failures occurred across departments (ie, between 
teams). The majority (92%) of communication failures were 
verbal, involved a single transmitter and a single receiver, and 
were caused by omission of critical information (49%) or 
incorrect interpretation of information (44%).78,268
Much of the original research of handoff failures focused 
on transfers of care within a team, such as residents cross-
covering patients. In one survey conducted at Massachusetts 
General Hospital, 59% of responding residents reported that 1 
or more patients had been harmed in their last rotation because 
of poor handoffs, and 12% reported that the harm was major.269 
Only a minority of the handoffs occurred in a quiet setting, 
and interruptions were frequent.269 A similar study found that 
31% of residents reported a patient event that involved their 
patient for which the handoff had not prepared them.272 In one 
study of incidents involving transfer of patients from team to 
team, 29% involved no handoff procedure at all.273
It is not surprising that the majority of patient transfers 
involve communication failures, given the complexity of 
patient information, nuances of physiology difficult to objec-
tively translate for the next team, and frequent distractions. 
The literature supports the perception that the handoff pro-
cess is highly variable, unstructured, and fraught with envi-
ronmental noise, distraction, and competing task priorities 
(eg, resetting monitors during the verbal transfer of informa-
tion).274 In an observational study of cardiac surgery handoff 
events, important content items were reported only 53% of 
the time; an average of 2.3 distractions occurred per minute of 
communication.275
Patient information transfer failures occur across the con-
tinuum of surgical care; the majority occur during the pre-
procedural and postoperative handoff phases.266 Only 30% 
of surgical information was transmitted verbally, and often 
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not by surgeons but by anesthesiology personnel. In a study 
from Great Britain, transfers of care between OR and recov-
ery room were nonstandardized and varied depending on the 
staff involved.276 Varying expectations of content and timing 
of the information transfer were held by anesthesiology and 
recovery personnel, and there was no standard point during 
the handoff when responsibility was transferred. In a study of 
a process that first rigorously defined, and then measured, crit-
ical information to be transmitted and tasks to be completed 
during an OR/recovery handoff,265,277 nearly a third of critical 
facts were not transmitted (median of 9.1 omissions among 29 
defined items), and a third of tasks (median 2.9 task errors of 
the 8 defined tasks) were not completed.277 Critical members 
of the multidisciplinary team were often not present during the 
handoff process.265
The quality of the handoff information degrades across the 
continuum of care: Only 56% of essential information was 
transmitted from OR to recovery, and only 44% from recov-
ery to the ward.266 Seventy-five percent of observed patients 
had at least 1 clinical incident or adverse event attributable to 
such failures.266
Few studies have analyzed why communication failures 
occur during handoffs, or what information is essential. No 
study has tested the validity of what they designate as “essen-
tial information.” Despite these limitations, virtually every 
intervention designed to improve handoff quality has shown 
positive effects. In a prospective study of congenital cardiac 
surgery handoffs from OR to ICU, implementation of a team-
work-driven process and protocol reduced errors from 6.24 
per handoff to1.52 and reduced critical verbal information 
omissions from 6.33 to 2.38 per handoff.77 Implementation of 
a protocol based on Formula 1 pit stops that specified the pre-
handoff preparation, tasks to be completed before information 
transfer, and specific information to be transferred reduced 
technical errors, reduced the number of information omis-
sions, and shortened the handoff from 10.8 to 9.4 minutes.278
Another study found that implementation of a simple fill-
in-the-blank, 1-page tool improved total handoff scores, as 
well as surgical intraoperative information subscores, but 
did not prolong handoff duration.279 Craig and colleagues280 
echoed these results in their pediatric cardiac study of a dif-
ferent handoff tool; implementation resulted in a significant 
improvement in attentiveness, organization, and information 
flow and a reduction in interruptions. Finally, implementa-
tion of a standardized handoff protocol for cardiac patients 
between OR and ICU increased the presence of all critical per-
sonnel at the handoff from 0% to 68% of the time, decreased 
omitted information from 26% to 19%, and increased satis-
faction scores from 61% to 81% among the ICU nurses.281 
However, the fact that the percentage of missed information 
remained at 19% after implementation indicates the scope of 
the problem.
The use of electronic technology in handoff protocols 
has been proposed, but few data exist. The framework of an 
automated protocol termed MAGIC (Multimedia Abstract 
Generation of Intensive Care) integrates cognitive and quan-
titative methods to create an electronic prompted briefing 
that provides a consistent set of handoff information.282 The 
Association of periOperative Registered Nurses has developed 
resources with sample handoff documents and educational 
materials for clinicians.283
A less prescriptive protocol specifies only the type and 
order of basic topics to be covered, often using the mnemonic 
SBAR (situation-background-assessment-recommendation). 
The use of SBAR during handoffs has been suggested to 
facilitate more accurate communication of patient, anesthetic, 
and surgical information284 and has been used by cardiac nurse 
practitioners to facilitate a patient’s progress through the car-
diac surgery continuum of care.285 A curriculum that used 
videos and role playing to teach SBAR reduced the rate of 
order-entry errors.286
Communication between physically separated teams (refer-
ring cardiologist and cardiac surgeon) can be even more dif-
ficult. The use of a dedicated Internet connection between 
catheterization centers and a surgical center for electronic 
transmission of angiography data shortened the time between 
catheterization and surgical decision from 36 hours to 1 
hour.287 The time interval between diagnosis and emergent or 
urgent surgery decreased from 56 to 18 hours. No outcome 
or economic data were collected, but electronic transmission 
of essential patient data may well reduce errors and speed the 
delivery of care.
Several interventions have been tested across the continuum 
of care, which can involve multiple handoffs. One approach is 
to reduce handoff errors by minimizing the number of hand-
offs, primarily by using a universal bed. With this approach, 
a given patient can receive ICU, step-down, or ward level 
of care in a single physical location, with a single team of 
nurses and surgeons. Compared with national norms (Society 
of Thoracic Surgeons database, http://www.STS.org), univer-
sal bed patients had decreased ventilation time, ICU stay, and 
hospital stay and no sternal wound infections (0/610), with 
average cost savings between $6200 and $9500 per patient.288
Summary Statements
1. Communication skills have been measured as the worst 
aspect of teamwork behavior in the OR.
2. Multiple general and cardiac surgical studies have shown 
that communication failures are the most common root 
cause of errors and adverse outcomes.
3. The critical elements of teamwork can be summarized 
by 6 “C’s”: communication, cooperation, coordination, 
cognition (collective knowledge and shared understand-
ing), conflict resolution, and coaching (team training).
4. Interventions to reduce human error include teamwork-
training efforts. Studies such as the Veteran’s Administra-
tion Medical Team Training (MTT) and the TeamSTEPPS 
program (government-sponsored by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality and the Department of 
Defense), have demonstrated significant improvements 
in OR teamwork and communication scores, as well as 
 reductions in surgical mortality and morbidity; however, 
sustained improvement requires repetition and/or contin-
ued coaching.
5. Other interventions to reduce errors include checklists, 
such as the Surgical Safety Checklist (developed by 
WHO), and preoperative briefings and postoperative 
debriefings. Studies have demonstrated that the process 
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of adoption of checklists improves outcomes, including 
reduction in central line infections, ventilator-associated 
pneumonia, and mortality.
6. Other studies have demonstrated that briefings reduce 
distractions and flow disruptions, enhance team per-
formance, and may reduce complications, although 
widespread implementation of these practices has been 
hindered by psychological and cultural impediments.
7. Simulation is a promising tool for assessing and train-
ing surgical personnel in nontechnical skills, including 
communication, cooperation, coordination, cognition, 
conflict resolution, and coaching, as well as the relation-
ship between technical and nontechnical skills.
8. Transfer from one team to another occurs many times for 
patients undergoing cardiac surgery, and communication 
failures are common during these handoffs. Although 
few studies have analyzed why communication failures 
occur, or what information is truly essential, all studies 
of interventions designed to improve handoff quality 




“Environment” is defined as “the circumstances, objects, or 
conditions by which one is surrounded.”289 In the OR, the envi-
ronment comprises the physical space, the equipment, and the 
people (staff and patients). Ergonomics, defined as “an applied 
science concerned with designing and arranging things people 
use so that the people and things interact most efficiently and 
safely,”289 has been suboptimal with respect to patient safety 
in the OR.8,290–292 Improvements in OR design and space have 
lagged behind changes in surgical practices,293,294 and the past 10 
years have seen an enormous influx of new technologies, creating 
an overcrowded environment.295 Many consider poor room and 
equipment ergonomics to be a major factor in the flow disrup-
tions that contribute to technical errors; poor room and equipment 
ergonomics may be related to surgical-site infections.20,294–296
Space and Design
Both the size and layout of the OR can influence safety. In 
small ORs, equipment clutters the space and results in flow 
disruptions, whereas excessively large OR suites require 
staff to traverse longer distances. Brogmus and colleagues297 
reported that same-level slips, trips, and falls are the second-
leading cause of workplace injury and cite 3 tripping hazards: 
cords and cables, low-profile equipment and supplies, and 
protective and absorptive mats. Cesarano and Piergeorge298 
described the “spaghetti syndrome,” a phenomenon in which 
cluttered equipment and entangled lines obstruct clinicians 
from safely reaching the patient, endangering both patients 
and staff. Bringing power and equipment to the patient creates 
a significant challenge.299
Personnel and Traffic
The presence and flux of personnel in an OR are unavoidable 
but can be detrimental to OR safety, both because of the cre-
ation of distractions and the increased potential for infection. 
Approximately 20% of OR traffic is related to staff requests 
for information, 25% is related to staff breaks, and 20% is 
attributable to the delivery or retrieval of equipment.300 Healey 
et al19 correlated OR traffic with interference levels, such as 
shift changes that distract the operating surgeon, and con-
cluded that these distractions are poor OR practices that can 
be improved.
Increased traffic implies a higher frequency of door open-
ings, which has been shown to decrease the effectiveness of 
the ventilation system in clearing potential contaminants.301 
More door openings also may increase bacterial counts by per-
mitting the mixing of OR air with corridor air.302 In orthopedic 
and general surgery cases, the average number of door swings 
per hour ranges from 37 to 135 and approaches 1 every other 
minute.300,303 In cardiac surgery, the mean rate of door open-
ings is 19.2 per hour, and 22.8 per hour if prosthetic devices 
are involved.304 This equates to an average period of 6.4 min-
utes per hour in which the door is open. Microbiological 
counts in unoccupied ORs increase significantly when a door 
is left open to the hallway.305
Additional personnel in the OR may contribute to infection 
risk. Having 5 additional OR personnel above the required 
minimum increased the microbiological counts >15-fold.305 
Another study of orthopedic trauma surgery found a strong 
positive correlation between the number of colony-forming 
units and the number of people in the operating room.306 This 
relationship between the number of people in the OR and the 
incidence of surgical infection may be attributable to the num-
ber of people per se or to the greater amount of traffic into and 
around the room.306,307
Equipment
Although equipment and machines improve our lives and 
improve patient care, they can cause harm by injuring patients 
directly, by increasing errors related to poor design, and 
through poorly designed alarm systems that contribute to 
noise. Equipment-related problems account for ≈11% of flow 
disruptions in cardiac surgery.20,75,308 In a review of hazards 
in cardiac surgery, Martinez and colleagues8 noted numerous 
issues with equipment (eg, esophageal injury caused by trans-
esophageal echocardiography probe insertion), CPB (eg, aortic 
dissection with onset of bypass), and surgical equipment (eg, 
air emboli caused by a blower-mister device). Machines and 
technology were identified to cause patient harm in 4 ways: 
(1) Misuse (poor training or negligence), (2) the inherent risks 
of using the device, (3) poor maintenance and upkeep, and (4) 
poor machine design. Poor training or lack of certification in 
the use of the device, improper risk balancing by clinicians, 
and failure to follow best practices in equipment maintenance 
can increase the risk.8 In addition, a common theme among 
published reports of equipment-related adverse events is a 
failure to explore the contributing systematic errors.8
Much of modern equipment is designed with the focus on 
mechanical efficiency and biocompatibility, with little empha-
sis on how design can impact human error. Wiegmann and col-
leagues309 studied CPB machines using a failure mode effect 
analysis and found that information displays suffered from prob-
lems with placement, legibility, and format. Components were 
poorly integrated into the machine, and the space-design and 
placement of the components was not ideal. Alarms were found 
to be too quiet or too loud or to have inappropriate tonality.
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In fact, one of the most troublesome contributors to OR 
distractions is alarms generated by machinery.310–312 Alarms 
are designed to make the operator aware of conditions outside 
of predetermined norms and can identify dangerous condi-
tions. A typical cardiothoracic OR, however, has ≈18 different 
alarms with a mix of visual and audio alerts.313 Schmid et al314 
reported that 359 alarms occurred per cardiac surgery proce-
dure, at 1.2 per minute. Unfortunately, up to 90% of all alarms 
are false-positives,315 which desensitizes OR personnel to true 
alarms. One study analyzed 731 warnings during cardiac sur-
gery by linking them to the response of the anesthesiologist: 
only 7% were useful, whereas 13% followed a planned inter-
vention and could have been predicted and eliminated.313
Noise
As noted above, the OR traffic, conversations, alarms, and, 
in some cases, music can lead to a deafening noise level in 
the OR316 that exceeds both Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration and National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health standards.317 This noise level can be dan-
gerous to the hearing of both patients and physicians and can 
affect patient outcomes.318,319 In one study, abdominal surgery 
patients who subsequently developed a surgical-site infection 
had operative environments with significantly higher sound 
levels.319 Conversations about non–surgery-related topics 
were associated with significantly higher sound levels.319
An observational study conducted by Moorthy et al250 con-
cluded that OR noise reaching 80 dB was associated with a 
significant increase in medical errors during in situ laparo-
scopic procedures. Clinical impairment may be compounded 
by inexperience; a randomized controlled trial found that 
music had a detrimental effect on the surgical performance 
of novice laparoscopic surgeons.320 Some research, how-
ever, suggests that the appropriate use of music in the OR 
can reduce stress and improve the performance of some OR 
staff.290 Nevertheless, 25% of surveyed anesthesiologists 
stated that OR music impaired their ability to effectively com-
municate with other staff.321 Music that is pleasing and helpful 
to one practitioner might be distracting to other OR person-
nel.322 Compounding this issue is that each subteam in the OR 
has a different cognitive workload at different times during a 
case (Figure 4),263 potentially leading to casual conversation 
just when another team member needs absolute quiet.
The Optimal OR
There is a paucity of scientific literature regarding optimal 
OR design and layout, with many editorial suggestions but 
few studies showing better outcomes. Two studies have linked 
improvements in the physical environment to (1) reduction in 
staff stress and fatigue, which increases effectiveness in deliv-
ering care; (2) improvement in patient safety; (3) improve-
ment in outcomes; and (4) improvement in overall healthcare 
quality.323,324 Optimal size may reduce adverse patient events 
and mitigate OR staff injuries,297 which has led to recommen-
dations that rooms for cardiovascular procedures be ≥600 sq 
ft.325 The guiding principles for optimal OR design, as sum-
marized by Killen,322 are as follows: (1) Standardize the loca-
tion of the head of the table and the handedness of the room; 
(2) provide adequate space for staff to move around and for 
equipment; (3) maintain focus on the patient; (4) ensure that 
all staff have a line of sight to the patient at all times; and 
(5) use technology to help workflow. Novel ideas such as 
rounded room corners, walls shaped to transition to doors, and 
floor patterns that provide additional visual guides have been 
proposed.297
Optimal room flow requires avoiding unnecessary conges-
tion, with equipment positioned to maintain open corridors 
and to keep the floor clear and free of hazards, such as avoid-
ing cords across walking paths.297 Ceiling-mounted booms 
can reduce the number of cords and cables across high-traffic 
areas.291,326 The setup of equipment should be consistent, with 
dedicated space for the sterile field, OR table, Mayo stands, 
anesthesia equipment, and perfusion setup.326 Sterile core and 
patient-entry doors should be positioned away from swinging 
equipment booms and stationary machines. OR doors should 
be situated to protect the sterile surgical field from work zone 
traffic.325
Restricting the number of people in the OR and regulat-
ing OR traffic may reduce the movement of airborne con-
taminants shed by people and objects.305,306 The most recent 
Association of periOperative Registered Nurses “Standards 
and Recommended Practices” present best practices for traffic 
patterns.302
There is a lack of published literature regarding the optimal 
physical location of materials and supplies for a cardiac OR, 
but guidelines specify a minimum of 50 sq ft of storage space 
per OR.325 Common sense would suggest that storing supplies 
inside the OR suite would improve workflow and mitigate 
door openings, but virtually no data on this practice exist. 
Regardless, preoperative briefings reduce trips to the core.222
Regarding noise in the operating room, no studies have yet 
demonstrated improved outcome with noise reduction efforts. 
Some have suggested that a sterile cockpit approach should 
be adopted.327 However, as Wadhera and colleagues263 have 
illustrated, each team has a different cognitive workload at 
different times during a case (Figure 4). These investigators 
propose having structured conversations at key parts in the 
operation (eg, heparin administration, cannulation, initiation 
of CPB, separation from CPB), but this intervention has not 
been tested for its impact on reducing errors.
Integration of the sheer volume of auditory and visual infor-
mation available during any case is challenging. Monitors and 
charting systems should be positioned to allow clinicians to 
face the sterile field and remain attentive to the surgical proce-
dure.326 In 2006, Egan328 described the Massachusetts General 
Hospital’s “operating room of the future.” By integrating 
information from various monitors, computers, and equip-
ment through wall panels with unobstructed views, personnel 
were kept abreast of the surgical procedure. The simplifica-
tion of information transfer reduced the amount of equipment 
surrounding the patient and possibly improved communica-
tion.328 Finally, real-time imaging of the surgical procedure 
can be shared with team members off-site, which would facili-
tate handoffs.329,330
Integration of electronic medical records with anesthetic 
and surgical interventions can curtail alarm fatigue and alarm-
related distractions. Kruger and Tremper313 proposed 3 key 
areas for future research: (1) Design of these systems to bridge 
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the gap between academic prototypes and integration into 
clinical practice; (2) integration of various types of medical 
domain knowledge into comprehensive physiologic and dis-
ease models and (3) advanced algorithms to use this domain 
knowledge for high-sensitivity and -specificity alerts.
Finally, high-fidelity simulation laboratories can be used 
to investigate where the human-machine interface can be 
improved, providing insight into how industry can make the 
next generation of machines safer.331 Simulation laboratories 
can also permit testing of optimal room design and layout 
without putting patients at risk.
Summary Statements
1. Poor OR ergonomics (size and layout) contribute to 
human error and safety hazards, including procedure-
flow disruptions, technical errors, and surgical-site infec-
tion, as well as workplace injuries for surgical personnel.
2. Optimal OR design ensures standardization of the loca-
tion of the head of the patient bed and surgical table, 
adequate space for equipment and staff movement, 
maintenance of focus on the patient, and use of technol-
ogy to help workflow.
3. Reduction of traffic in the OR may reduce patient risk 
(procedure-flow disruption and surgical-site infection).
4. Noise levels in the OR, caused by equipment alarms, 
conversations, and music, present hazards for patients 
(surgical performance, surgical-site infections) and sur-
gical personnel (hearing loss).
Safety Culture
Organizational Culture
Deficits in safety culture have been implicated in adverse 
outcomes after cardiac surgery.8 A climate of teamwork and 
collaboration, along with safety-minded work processes and 
communication styles that focus on error prevention, is ideal, 
allowing those in high-risk clinical environments such as car-
diac surgery to identify and prevent patient harm.332–334
Many cardiac surgery safety studies have been retrospective 
studies, with the goal to identify trends.8,13,16–18,78,292 Few have 
been prospective studies, and fewer have tested interventions 
designed to improve safety. Nevertheless, they indicate where 
improvements can be made. For example, underdeveloped 
quality assurance programs contributed to unexpectedly high 
mortality rates in pediatric cardiac hospitals in Bristol, United 
Kingdom,335,336 and Winnipeg, Canada.337–339 Providers at the 
Bristol Infirmary had raised concerns about poor outcomes 
that went unheeded, attributable in large part to the absence of 
a central quality assurance department to identify and address 
problems. In Winnipeg, the low volume of cases exacerbated 
a troubled quality assurance program that was inadequate to 
detect and respond to sentinel events. Both cases illustrate the 
dual danger of a culture reluctant to acknowledge issues, even 
when raised internally, and poorly responsive quality assur-
ance systems.
In this section, we review organizational culture in health 
care, identify behaviors that undermine safety, and explore 
organizational contributors to safety attitudes, including the 
sparse literature specific to cardiac surgery.
Organizational Culture in the Healthcare Environment
An institution’s organizational culture, that is, its aggregate 
beliefs, assumptions, and value systems, greatly influences the 
attitude manifested by its personnel toward keeping patients 
safe. Seemingly similar institutions can have quite different 
cultures and subcultures. Most hospital personnel are unaware 
of how they contribute to and shape the safety culture in 
their own environment. The current hierarchical structure of 
health care has evolved over many years, but organizational 
cultures that emphasize deference and power differences 
between healthcare workers may be unsafe, given the increas-
ing complexity and technological sophistication, particularly 
in cardiac surgery. Increasing data on the impact of culture 
on patient safety highlight the need for a reevaluation of the 
current educational and training paradigm toward more col-
laborative and interdisciplinary approaches.339–342
Safety Culture Versus Safety Climate
An organization’s safety culture refers to those collective 
behaviors and values that influence its ability to identify and 
mitigate hazards and systemic conditions that contribute to 
Figure 4. Mental workload in the cardiac surgery 
operating room varies across the cardiac surgery 
procedure for individual providers depending on 
task complexity and responsibilities.  
CRNA indicates certified registered nurse 
anesthetist; CST, certified surgical technologist; 
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration; Postop, postoperative; Prep, 
surgical preparation; RN, registered nurse; and TLX, 
Task Load Index. Reprinted from Wadhera et al263 
with permission from Elsevier. Copyright © 2010, 
The American Association for Thoracic Surgery.
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error. Safety culture has been stated to be “the product of indi-
vidual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies 
and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, 
and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and 
safety management.”343 Although senior leadership is critical 
in establishing a safety-oriented culture, it is the frontline pro-
viders who must be fully engaged in creating a climate of QI 
and safety.
In contrast, organizational climate refers to the commit-
ment with which individuals or groups carry out an organiza-
tion’s vision and to what degree they adhere to established 
policies and procedures. Zohar344 refers to safety climate as 
“… shared perceptions with regard to safety policies, proce-
dures, and practices.” Climate is often defined as “the way 
we do business around here.” Safety culture tends to be more 
ethereal, whereas safety climate is more conducive to mea-
surement, particularly within a functional unit.
Although safety culture and climate are typically a function 
of the larger organization, small functional units such as the 
OR often have a unique culture and climate that are distinct 
from, albeit influenced by, the larger organization. In the OR 
environment, assessments of safety culture and climate using 
a variety of instruments such as questionnaires and surveys 
have raised a number of interesting and potentially actionable 
observations.69,156,197,345,346 One study in a non–cardiac sur-
gery setting identified marked differences between surgeons 
and nurses in the degree of familiarity with other team mem-
bers, a factor known to impact patient safety.21,28,60 In another 
study, nurses expressed more negative responses than physi-
cians concerning their work unit’s support of and attention to 
safety.346 It is important to recognize that such findings may 
not be generalizable and that culture measurement tools have 
inherent limitations and applicability.
Although a strong safety culture is thought to save lives, the 
relationship between culture and clinical performance is com-
plex and nuanced. Acting on findings from attitude surveys, 
combined with team-skills training sessions, has improved 
indices of emotional climate, teamwork, and threats to patient 
outcomes.69 Some authors have argued, however, that safety 
culture and actual performance are conceptually and practi-
cally different.341 Moreover, although measurable improve-
ments in safety attitudes can be elicited after interventions, 
it is unclear whether these effects are sustainable or translate 
into better patient outcomes.
In the area of cardiac surgery, only a few observational 
studies have assessed the impact of organizational character-
istics on potential outcomes.8 Fleming and colleagues80 used 
a questionnaire to assess leadership, organizational structure, 
and safety climate, in addition to confidence assertion, infor-
mation sharing, stress and fatigue, teamwork, work values, 
and error and procedural compliance. Respondents reported 
that established procedures and protocols frequently were not 
followed, and only 43% of the respondents reported feeling 
comfortable speaking up. Similar results have been reported 
in pediatric cardiac surgery.156 The unique milieu of the car-
diac OR includes heavy reliance on technology, with the 
added dimension of CPB and perfusionists. This highly com-
plex environment is ideal for the study and design of interven-
tions to improve team culture.347
Behaviors That Undermine a Culture of Safety
Rigid Hierarchical Culture
Organizations with a predominantly hierarchical culture are 
generally oriented toward and place a high premium on sta-
bility.348 These organizations are characterized by uniformity, 
rigid coordination, internal efficiency, and a close adherence 
to rules and regulations.348 These characteristics are not inher-
ently bad; in surgery, as in the military, a close adherence to 
rules and regulation and clear lines of authority are critical 
to effective performance. However, when these character-
istics lead to significant power distance, status asymmetry, 
and disruptive behavior, safety will be compromised, with 
team members reluctant to challenge authority or to speak up 
when errors are recognized.156,158,345 A centralized approach 
to management often results in frontline providers feeling 
less empowered to speak up or take action when confronted 
with safety issues.349,350 Hospitals and surgical teams with a 
rigid hierarchical culture have been shown to have inferior 
scores on performance measures351–356 and safety climate mea-
sures.349 Targeted interventions, as highlighted by Singer and 
colleagues,349 include team training that emphasizes the col-
lective shunning of unprofessional behavior and a commit-
ment to continuous QI.
Professionalism and Disruptive Behaviors
High-quality and safe patient care depends on teamwork, 
communication, and a collaborative work environment. 
Professionalism is maintained through the interplay of indi-
vidual behavior and organizational structure.357 The culture of 
health care has historically tolerated disruptive and intimidat-
ing behaviors in exchange for a high level of skills and exper-
tise.358 As the delivery of health services shifts from individual 
practitioners to team-based and multidisciplinary approaches, 
organizations that do not embrace interprofessional training 
and communication and that fail to eliminate maladaptive 
behaviors will be incapable of achieving highly reliable levels 
of safety and sustained outcomes.359–363
Surgical errors must be understood in the context of the 
culture of the surgical team.364 In a study of surgical teams, 
Mazzocco et al12 found that teams that exhibited fewer team-
work behaviors, particularly information sharing during the 
intraoperative phase and debriefing during the handoff phase, 
were at higher risk for patient death and complications. 
Another study found that teamwork factors alone accounted 
for ≈45% of the variance in the technical errors committed by 
cardiac surgeons.20 Finally, Nurok et al69 found an association 
between a perturbed emotional climate and poorer thoracic 
surgical team performance.
The literature continues to link disruptive behaviors to 
errors and even to mortality. In a study of the effects of work-
place intimidation on medication practices, 7% of respondents 
reported being involved in a medication error in which intimi-
dation played a role.365 In cardiac surgery, data are scarce, but 
Rosenstein and O’Daniel366 indicated that there was a “high 
predilection for disruptive behaviors to occur in high-stress 
areas with a greater potential for patient harm.” In a survey of 
4530 hospital physicians and nurses, 77% reported witnessing 
disruptive behavior among physicians and 65% reported wit-
nessing disruptive behavior among nurses at their hospitals.367 
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Respondents reported that general surgery was the specialty 
in which disruptive events occurred most often (28%), with 
cardiovascular surgery at 13%. This behavior cuts across 
all disciplines. In a perioperative study, 75% of respondents 
reported having witnessed disruptive behaviors in attending 
surgeons, 64% in anesthesiologists, 59% in nurses, 43% in 
surgical residents, and 35% in anesthesiology residents.368 
Additionally, 46% of respondents claimed they were aware 
of potential adverse events that could have occurred from dis-
ruptive behavior, and 19% reported that they had specifically 
witnessed an adverse event caused by disruptive behavior. 
More than 80% of the perioperative personnel reported loss 
of concentration, reduced communication/collaboration, and 
impaired relationships with other team members as a result 
of disruptive behavior. Finally, investigators have reported 
that frontline staff believes that these behaviors affect patient 
safety and outcomes.367,369,370
In 2009, The Joint Commission implemented leadership 
standards that required the “creation and maintenance of a cul-
ture of safety and quality throughout the hospital,” including 
having a disruptive behavior policy in place and a formal pro-
cess to manage unacceptable behaviors.371,372 These disruptive 
behaviors are specifically defined: “Intimidating and disruptive 
behaviors include overt actions such as verbal outbursts and 
physical threats, as well as passive activities such as refusing 
to perform assigned tasks or quietly exhibiting uncooperative 
attitudes during routine activities…. Such behaviors include 
reluctance or refusal to answer questions or return phone 
calls or pages; condescending language or voice intonation; 
and impatience with questions. Overt and passive behaviors 
undermine team effectiveness and can compromise the safety 
of patients.” Recently, The Joint Commission has revised the 
definitions to “behaviors that undermine a culture of safety.”373
There is considerable overlap between disruptive behaviors 
and workplace bullying. In one view, bullying is seen as the 
most extreme example of disruptive behavior. The Workplace 
Institute374 defines bullying as “repeated, health-harming 
mistreatment that takes 1 or more of the following forms: a) 
verbal abuse; b) offensive conduct/behaviors (including non-
verbal) which are threatening, humiliating, or intimidating; 
and c) work interference—sabotage—which prevents work 
from getting done.”
As a high-stress, high-intensity, complex environment, the 
perioperative setting is particularly susceptible to the insidi-
ous introduction of disruptive or bullying behavior. The envi-
ronment is tense, procedures do (and must) move quickly, and 
precision is expected. In particular, the bullying of nurses and 
other personnel in the OR may be caused in part by the inher-
ent stress of performing surgery, high patient acuity, shortage 
of perioperative professionals, overtime, on-call demands, 
and the fact that any one surgical subspecialty can be quite 
isolated.375 Disruptive behaviors are perpetuated by a physi-
cian-dominated hierarchical culture and a perceived “code of 
silence.”376 The inability to speak up for fear of retribution cre-
ates an environment in which small errors may accumulate to 
contribute to a major event. Bullying behavior erodes team-
work and the development of a safety culture.
The reluctance by healthcare organizations to address disrup-
tive behaviors may stem from multiple factors. Rosenstein376 
recommends a 10-step process (Table 2) to help organizations 
succeed in promoting a culture of patient safety. Recognition 
of an existing problem is the first step, with leadership com-
mitted to assessing the professional environment through vali-
dated tools to identify the prevalence of disruptive behavior. 
Collaborative leadership efforts can raise the level of aware-
ness and accountability by providing education and training. 
Agreed-upon policies and procedures must include safe, non-
punitive mechanisms for reporting disruptive behaviors. Thus, 
organizations and their individual employees can better com-
mit to patient safety and quality.376
For more than a decade, the Vanderbilt Medical Center has 
focused on promoting professionalism through identifying, 
measuring, and addressing unprofessional behaviors.360,377 
These efforts include 6 core principles: (1) Dedicated lead-
ership, (2) a model or framework for guiding intervention, 
(3) institutional policies, (4) surveillance tools, (5) training, 
and (6) accountability.360 Positive results included reduced 
malpractice claims, improved patient safety and quality, bet-
ter team communications, reduced reinforcement of negative 
behaviors, and behavior change among physicians.377 No stud-
ies specifically speak to the impact of such programs in car-
diac surgery.
The “Hero Culture” as a Vulnerability
Further complicating the hierarchical structure that allows 
unchallenged disruptive behavior, the “hero culture” of the 
exhausted surgical team is revered in the media, where the 
self-sacrificing surgeon and team members go beyond the 
point of exhaustion to serve patient needs. This image belies 
the impact of fatigue on performance. Although the studies 
were performed in noncardiac units, 2 separate reports docu-
mented the effect of prolonged working hours and associated 
sleep deprivation on attention failures378 and the incidence 
of serious medical errors committed by interns working in 
ICUs.379 Subsequently, other investigators showed that sleep 
Table 2. The 10-Step Process to Promoting a Culture of 
Safety376
1. Organizational culture
  a. Leadership commitment, assessment, structure
2. Clinical champions
3. Recognition and awareness
  a. Education
4. Structured education/training
  a. Diversity, sensitivity, stress management
  b. Conflict management, assertiveness
5. Collaboration/communication tools
6. Relationship building
7. Policies and procedures
8. Reporting mechanisms
9. Intervention
  a. Pre: assess safety culture before implementation of intervention
  b. Current: assess safety culture during implementation of intervention
  c. Post: assess safety culture after implementation of intervention
10. Reinforcement of patient safety initiatives
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deprivation increases the risk of accidental self-inflicted inju-
ries380,381 and the risk of medical residents (trainees) having 
car accidents during their daily commute.382 Growing concern 
that fatigue and extended working hours can contribute to 
poor performance and outcomes has led to regulatory efforts 
in resident training in an attempt to improve patient safety.383
Of the 3 studies that specifically focused on the role of fatigue 
and sleep deprivation in cardiac surgery, none demonstrated 
an association between sleep deprivation and major complica-
tions or mortality.384–386 However, the studies did not measure 
intermediate outcomes such as incidence of errors or of error 
capture and recovery, and the results may speak more to team 
resiliency in recovering from errors than to lack of an effect. 
A survey of perfusionists found that 15% were performing 
CPB after being awake for up to 36 hours, and 50% described 
experiencing microsleep during bypass.387 Two of 3 reported 
committing fatigue-related minor errors, and 6.7% admitted to 
serious perfusion-related accidents ascribed to fatigue.387
Cultivating a Culture of Safety
A great deal of the literature regarding changing an organiza-
tion’s culture is reported at the hospital level, not the cardiac 
OR level.346,349,388 Interventions to improve quality and safety 
in the OR are still in their infancy; convincing data demon-
strating that these interventions result in sustained improve-
ments in the safety climate of these high-hazard environments 
are still lacking. As described previously, interventions to 
improve communication in the cardiac ORs, such as check-
lists, briefings, and teamwork training, are typically associ-
ated with improvements in safety attitudes of OR personnel, 
as well as patient safety.* Attempts to impact an entire orga-
nization’s safety attitudes underscore the vexing nature and 
intractability of the culture problem.
Functional units have been shown to be amenable to struc-
tural, if not strategic, interventions. The Comprehensive Unit-
Based Safety Program (CUSP) is a safety culture program that 
has been tested, albeit in ICUs, not the OR.390 CUSP was the 
safety culture improvement intervention in the Keystone proj-
ect, an improvement collaborative to reduce catheter-based 
infection in 100 ICUs.208 CUSP is a 5-step iterative process 
that includes educating staff on the science of safety, identi-
fying defects, involving senior executives to work with staff 
to prioritize safety hazards and provide resources, learning 
from 1 defect per month, and implementing teamwork and 
improvement tools with intermittent quantitative assessments 
of culture. CUSP is integrated into the organization’s strategic 
plan but defers to frontline workers, giving them autonomy to 
identify and rectify safety hazards. Use of the CUSP approach 
together with specific checklists resulted in a virtual elimina-
tion of catheter infections,208 a significant decrease in ventila-
tor-associated pneumonia,210 and significant improvements in 
teamwork climates.390
Benefits of Organizational Focus on Quality
The experiences at Bristol and Winnipeg that led to the deaths 
of several pediatric cardiac surgery patients highlight the need 
for robust QI and quality assurance programs.335–339 In both 
cases, the institutions were inadequately equipped to either 
identify or address problems, and warnings went unheeded. The 
investigating authorities recommended radical changes, such 
as institutional prioritization of quality control systems, incor-
poration of feedback from all stakeholders (including patients 
and families), and establishment of a culture that encourages 
all clinicians to speak up and be heard. The authors noted that 
such an effort should be led by a centralized quality department 
to detect issues and monitor progress after interventions.335,339
Single-Center Improvements
As a result of the tight coupling that exists along the con-
tinuum of care, most QI initiatives in cardiac surgery are not 
focused exclusively on the OR. Comprehensive approaches 
used in the management of cardiac surgery patients include 
Total Quality Management,391,392 Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement Breakthrough Collaboratives,393 ProvenCare,394 
Operational Excellence,395 and others.396,397 The success of 
these efforts depends on the extent to which each model ful-
fills the elements of team trust, data integrity, clinical leader-
ship, institutional commitment, and infrastructure for QI.398
Doran and colleagues393,394 observed the use of the rapid-
cycle improvement model (ie, Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement Breakthrough Series) in a community adult car-
diac surgery program. They found significant improvements 
in hospital length of stay, time on the ventilator, patient satis-
faction, and cost. Stanford and colleagues391 published results 
of a Total Quality Management System, including surgeon-led 
implementation of perioperative checklists, nursing supervi-
sion to track progress, mortality and morbidity conferences 
focused on “fix the problem, not the blame,” and mandated 
multidisciplinary consultation. These interventions signifi-
cantly reduced the operative mortality of CABG patients.392
A single-center QI program (ProvenCare; Geisenger Health 
System, Danville, PA)394 asked cardiac surgeons to develop a 
40-element care bundle for elective CABG patients. Care ele-
ments were evidence based and hard-wired into the care pro-
cess to ensure consistent implementation. The care process was 
continually altered to improve implementation. Blood product 
use, ICU readmissions, and hospital readmissions decreased. 
Although the ProvenCare model has received considerable 
interest in controlling costs for health plans, its effectiveness 
and consistency also provide a model for continuous quality 
management with profound implications for safety culture.394
A process-oriented multidisciplinary approach (POMA) at 
a cardiac surgery program in Leeds, England, brought all care 
providers together preoperatively to evaluate and prepare the 
patient for CABG surgery.396 In a comparison of patients who 
underwent CABG before (n=262) and after (n=248) POMA 
was implemented, improvements in average length of stay, 
median procedural cost, and the incidences of atrial fibrilla-
tion and respiratory infections were noted.396
Uhlig et al397 described the implementation of formal 
multidisciplinary daily rounds on heart surgery patients that 
involved patients, family members, pharmacy personnel, 
nurses, social workers, physician assistants, and cardiac sur-
geons. This program markedly improved patient satisfaction 
and decreased mortality among CABG patients.
Finally, Culig et al395 described an “operational excellence” 
method derived from the Toyota Production System used in a *References 44, 63, 158, 164, 171, 183, 278, 389.
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new community cardiac surgery program. Shifting of the cul-
ture from a strict, hierarchical, “defects are punished” men-
tality to a collaborative “problems are blessings” mentality 
was accomplished through disciplined 10-minute daily meet-
ings, which included a formal problem-solving process. The 
display of relevant, real-time data on public boards was used 
to track ongoing progress.395 Over 2 years, the risk-adjusted 
CABG complication rate was 60% less than that observed for 
the regional population.395
A culture of safety and trust is a cornerstone of effective 
quality and safety improvements.399 Rather than a punitive 
culture of “blame and shame,” a “just culture” mentality pro-
vides conditions and behaviors necessary to develop trust.400,401 
Clinical leaders with training in the science of improvement 
can strengthen workplace trust with consistent behavior in 
identifying and working to resolve work defects.402 Such lead-
ership behavior demonstrates an institutional commitment to 
QI and provides a QI infrastructure.
Multicenter Collaborative Improvements
Over the years, multicenter collaborative efforts in cardiac 
surgery have improved quality and safety in cardiac surgery in 
large part by sharing of site-specific and surgeon-specific data 
and best practices. This model in cardiac surgery originated 
in 1987 with the formation of the Northern New England 
Cardiovascular Disease Study Group.403–406 Five hospitals 
and their cardiovascular teams started collecting and sharing 
patient demographic, process, and outcome data and devel-
oped risk-adjustment methodology for creation of predictive 
models. Site visits between hospitals and frequent face-to-face 
meetings focused on standardization, ongoing improvement, 
and shared learning.407 Use of this model has led to improve-
ments in overall mortality,408 mortality in women,409 and reex-
ploration for bleeding.410
On the basis of this success, other multicenter collab-
orative efforts have developed. In 1996, a group of cardiac 
surgeons initiated the Virginia Cardiac Surgery Quality 
Initiative,411 which encompasses 17 hospitals and 10 cardiol-
ogy and thoracic surgery groups. Focused projects resulted 
in statewide reductions in the incidence of perioperative 
atrial fibrillation, improved glycemic control, and decreased 
blood transfusion.412 The Michigan Society of Thoracic and 
Cardiovascular Surgeons formed a quality initiative with the 
goal of decreasing variation around best practices.413 Now 
funded by a health plan, their focus on interventions and data 
sharing has increased use of the left internal mammary artery 
in CABG surgery, and decreased the incidence of prolonged 
controlled ventilation.414,415 Other collaborative efforts in adult 
CABG patients include the Alabama Coronary Artery Bypass 
Grafting Project, Washington Clinical Outcomes Program, 
California Local/Regional Cardiac Surgery Database, and 
Minnesota Local/Regional Cardiac Surgery Database.398
Some studies have questioned the general effectiveness 
of QI collaboration.416,417 Lack of funding, data fatigue, and 
the competitive pressures among surgeons may limit collab-
orations to a finite lifespan. Future research to examine the 
usefulness of external data sharing and interorganizational 
learning may identify those properties and characteristics that 
maximize performance among all participants. The extensive 
availability of information technologies and quality control 
tools with refinements designed for the healthcare environ-
ment will aid groups in deploying interventions that will result 
in continuous outcomes improvement.
Future Research
Multidisciplinary prospective studies regarding predisposition 
to error may be the next phase in the evolution of understand-
ing of human error in the cardiac surgical setting.347,418,419 This 
human factors research includes study of the larger organi-
zation, the workspace, the necessary clinical and technical 
processes, human interaction with equipment, and particu-
larly human interaction with one another (communication and 
teamwork). Investigators with clinical expertise (surgeons, 
nurses, anesthesiologists, and perfusionists) and nonclini-
cal expertise (human factors engineers and systems analysts) 
must collaborate to perform this research420 To gain a better 
understanding of safety and performance in the cardiac OR, 
Catchpole and Weigmann347 recommend future emphasis on 
study design, a systems approach to improvement, and mea-
surement of impact on outcomes. This methodology gener-
ates observations and analyses regarding what really happens, 
rather than what “should” happen, and goes beyond incident 
reporting of near-misses and adverse events.347
Summary Statements
1. Most studies of patient safety in cardiac surgery are reac-
tive (retrospective studies that seek to identify trends) 
rather than prospective studies to test interventions to 
reduce human error or improve safety.
2. The Joint Commission has implemented standards 
requiring “creation and maintenance of a culture of 
safety and quality throughout the hospital,” including 
having a disruptive behavior policy in place and a formal 
process to manage unacceptable behaviors.
3. Poor teamwork behaviors and a tense emotional climate 
are linked to surgical team errors and patient outcomes.
4. Local and regional QI initiatives in cardiac surgical set-
tings specifically have resulted in improvements in blood 
product use, time on the ventilator, hospital length of 
stay, ICU readmissions, hospital readmissions, mortal-
ity, patient satisfaction, and cost.
5. Multicenter collaborative QI efforts in cardiac surgery 
specifically to share demographic, process, and outcomes 
data, as well as site visits between hospitals, have resulted 
in regional standardization of best practices and improve-
ments in overall mortality, mortality in women, use of 
blood transfusions, prolonged ventilator support, glycemic 
control, and increased use of internal mammary arteries.
Conclusions
Cardiac surgery is a high-risk endeavor that requires an 
intense focus on patient safety, but sustainability requires a 
culture of safety. The research in this area is nascent but infor-
mative. Hospitals and research groups are testing interven-
tions designed to improve teamwork and communication and 
other interventions intended to reduce disruptive behaviors 
and fatigue. Placing patient safety first will ultimately lead to 
greater patient satisfaction and better clinical outcomes.
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Recommendations for Future Action and 
Research: A “Call to Action” for Patient Safety
WHO has made the reduction of surgical errors one of its pri-
mary goals. WHO published guidelines in 2008 that identified 
multiple recommended practices to ensure the safety of surgi-
cal patients.421 However, errors persist. Traditional approaches 
to reducing human error, typically driven by hospital or profes-
sional society quality assurance committees, have established 
precedents that make significant improvements in patient safety 
difficult. A few interventions are supported by currently avail-
able, albeit limited evidence, as noted in each topic area above. 
Priority for implementation of these interventions would almost 
certainly improve patient safety. Furthermore, a concerted effort 
to expand the scientific study of human error as a unique area of 
clinical research could provide opportunities to improve patient 
safety in the cardiac OR, as well as other surgical and interven-
tional settings (eg, the cardiac catheterization suite). Specific 
areas of study would certainly include (1) research to better 
understand communication failures and breakdowns in team-
work; (2) the best way to implement and reinforce interventions 
to improve communication and teamwork (eg, teamwork train-
ing, briefings and debriefings, and simulation); (3) interventions 
to promote professionalism and safety culture; and (4) OR ergo-
nomics, including ideal space and layout to minimize flow dis-
ruptions and personnel traffic. Ideally, both provider outcomes 
such as behavior change and communication skills and patient 
outcomes such as morbidity (eg, infections) and costs would be 
measured.
Opportunities to Facilitate Translation of Current 
Knowledge Regarding Communication and 
Teamwork Into Clinical Practice
Table 3 displays the American College of Cardiology 
Foundation and American Heart Association scheme for the 
classification of recommendations and level of evidence. The 
writing group’s conclusions and recommendations using this 
classification scheme are listed below.
Table 3. Applying Classification of Recommendations and Level of Evidence
A recommendation with Level of Evidence B or C does not imply that the recommendation is weak. Many important clinical questions addressed in the guidelines do not 
lend themselves to clinical trials. Although randomized trials are unavailable, there may be a very clear clinical consensus that a particular test or therapy is useful or effective.
*Data available from clinical trials or registries about the usefulness/efficacy in different subpopulations, such as sex, age, history of diabetes, history of prior 
MI, history of heart failure, and prior aspirin use.
†For comparative effectiveness recommendations (Class I and IIa; Level of Evidence A and B only), studies that support the use of comparator verbs should involve 
direct comparisons of the treatments or strategies being evaluated.
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Communication failures are common and have been impli-
cated as a cause of error and adverse outcomes in both general 
and cardiac surgery.† Research in aviation and the military has 
demonstrated that team training can facilitate improved coordi-
nation and enhanced performance. Substantial data do exist in 
surgical settings regarding the impact of training in nontechni-
cal communication skills; for example, checklists, briefings and 
debriefings, other structured communication tools and protocols, 
team training, and simulation training.‡ However, except for the 
standardized time-out process, which is required by The Joint 
Commission, widespread adoption of standardized critical inter-
action by use of protocols has not occurred in cardiac or other 
ORs. Furthermore, in a few longer-term studies of team training, 
it appears that improvements are not easily sustained.164,197,198
Recommendations
1. Checklists and/or briefings should be implemented 
in every cardiac surgery case, and postoperative 
debriefings should be encouraged by leadership in 
cardiac ORs (Class I; Level of Evidence B).
2. Team training to improve communication, leadership, 
and situational awareness should be implemented in 
cardiac ORs and should involve all members of the 
cardiac operative team (Class I; Level of Evidence B).
3. Formal handoff protocols should be implemented 
during transfer of the care of cardiac surgical 
patients to new medical personnel (Class I; Level of 
Evidence B).
4. It is reasonable to conduct event scenario training 
for significant and rare nonroutine events (ie, emer-
gency oxygenator change out) on a regular basis that 
involves the complete cardiac surgery team (Class 
IIa; Level of Evidence C).
5. It is reasonable to conduct future studies of team-
work and communication that (a) investigate optimal 
communication models (eg, briefings and structured 
communication protocols in the cardiac surgical 
OR); (b) investigate team-training models to deter-
mine the “best product” for use in the cardiac OR; 
(c) investigate impediments to implementation of for-
mal training in teamwork and communication skills; 
(d) include long-term studies of the sustained impact 
of such training on provider outcomes (eg, attitudes 
regarding safety, compliance with best practices, and 
communication skills); (e) investigate efficacy of for-
mal training in teamwork and communication skills 
in improving patient outcomes (eg, satisfaction, blood 
product use, infections, ICU readmissions, mortality, 
and costs); and (f) include establishment of an anon-
ymous national multidisciplinary event-reporting 
system to obtain data about events and near-misses 
(Class IIa; Level of Evidence C).
Physical Environment Research Opportunities
Poor OR ergonomics are present in many, if not most, car-
diac ORs. Hazards for both patients and staff exist, including 
infection in patients related to personnel traffic and air-
flow,305,307 risk of injury to staff caused by tripping over cords 
and equipment,297,298 and hazardous noise levels for everyone 
in the room because of alarms, music, and multiple simulta-
neous conversations.§ Optimal OR design to maintain effi-
cient flow and restriction of the number of personnel may 
reduce hazards. Integration of information from various 
monitors and reduction of noise and alarm fatigue, by design 
of high-sensitivity and -specificity alerts, may improve 
patient safety.313,328
Recommendations
1. It is reasonable to investigate the optimal design and 
testing of information systems in the OR to reduce 
alarm-related distractions and improve clinicians’ 
ability to integrate knowledge from multiple sources 
(Class IIa; Level of Evidence C).
2. It may be reasonable to test optimal room design and 
layout, both in real-time and in simulation laborato-
ries, as an innovative area of future research, which 
may avoid expensive design errors (Class IIb; Level 
of Evidence C).
Safety Culture: Implementation of Policies 
Regarding Professionalism and Quality
In 2009, The Joint Commission implemented standards 
requiring the creation and maintenance of a culture of safety, 
including having a disruptive behavior policy in place and 
a formal process to manage unacceptable behaviors.371,372 
Subspecialty units, including the cardiac operating team, 
may develop a unique culture with both positive and nega-
tive aspects.
Recommendations
1. Local institutional policies that define disruptive 
behavior in medical professionals in all hospital 
settings should be implemented immediately, with 
transparent and formal procedures for addressing 
unacceptable behaviors and interventions to elimi-
nate such behaviors (Class I; Level of Evidence C).
2. We recommend that every institution commit to 
a culture of safety by establishing a robust qual-
ity assurance and QI program to (a) continuously 
identify system, unit, and individual safety hazards; 
(b) provide leadership and resources to eliminate 
identified hazards; and (c) encourage and value 
the input of all members of the cardiac surgery 
team in a nonpunitive atmosphere (Class I; Level 
of Evidence C).
Safety Culture: Research Opportunities
Only a few studies have assessed the impact of organizational 
culture on provider or patient outcomes.394,395,397 Currently 
available data provide limited evidence that patient outcomes 
(eg, satisfaction, blood product use, infections, ICU readmis-
sions, mortality, and costs) may be improved with patient 
safety and QI initiatives. It is unknown whether improvements 
in safety-oriented provider attitudes and organizational cul-
ture are sustainable.
†References 13, 16, 18, 20–23, 58, 59, 72, 76–80.
‡References 44, 45, 63, 66, 68, 162, 164, 170–173, 176, 178, 182–184, 
190–192, 195, 197, 198, 204, 208, 210, 215, 217–220, 222, 223, 422, 423.
§References 296, 304, 310, 311, 314, 316, 317, 321.








Wahr et al  Patient Safety in the Cardiac Operating Room  1159
Recommendations
1. Scientific testing of interventions in the complex 
 technology-oriented setting of the cardiac OR is reason-
able, including interventions that (a) test existing tools 
and develop new tools designed to improve safety cul-
ture and climate; (b) provide ongoing assessment after 
intervention(s), to measure sustainability of improve-
ments in safety culture; and (c) lead to establishment of 
multi-institutional large clinical trials to assess the efficacy 
of improvements in safety culture in reducing selected 
adverse patient outcomes (Class IIb; Level of Evidence C).
2. Design and funding of multidisciplinary prospective 
studies of human and systems factors that predispose 
to error in the cardiac OR is reasonable (Class IIb; 
Level of Evidence C).  
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とした研究19 によると 1時間当たり 17.4回，他の研究20
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図 1 単独冠動脈バイパス術（CABG）患者における手術死亡率と脳合併症発生率の推移（2000〜2009年）．調査期間中，実際
の手術死亡率は 24.4%（2.4% から 1.9%へ）低下し，実際の脳合併症発生率は 26.4%（1.6% から 1.2%へ）低下し
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図 2 事故モデル．高度の潜在的危険を伴う手技においては，病院，病院経営陣および個人のヒューマンエラーに起因した見
える失敗と隠れた失敗が重なると，有害事象の発生につながる場合がある．Elsevierの許可を得て Cartheyら13 から転



































can Heart Associationʼs Council on Cardiovascular
Surgery and Anesthesia の委員で構成される執筆委員会
と以下の非営利団体の協力会員が共同執筆したものであ
る．参加非営利団体：心血管麻酔学会［Society of Cardio-
vascular Anesthesiologists］と そ の FOCUS 構 想
［Flawless Operative Cardiovascular Unified Systems］，
胸部外科医学会［Society of Thoracic Surgeon，STS］，
周術期管理看護師協会［Association of Perioperative
Registered Nurses，AORN］，ヒューマンファクター・























































































る49．Observational Teamwork Assessment for Sur-
gery（OTAS）29, 33, 39-44, 49，Oxford Non-Technical Skills
（NOTECHS）15, 45-48，Non-Technical Skills in Surgery
（NOTSS）50-52，Anesthesia Non-Technica l Sk i l ls
（ANTS）53, 54，Scrub Practitionersʼ Non-Technical Skills

























については 2 つのツール，すなわち Surgical Flow Dis-






















させた Neily ら63 は，対策の効果を明らかにするために
108 の退役軍人省病院（Veterans Affairs hospitals）で




















NOTECHS は「Oxford Non-Technical Skills」，OTAS は
「Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery」を指
す．

































たる原因とされている16, 21-23, 58, 76．一般外科と心臓外科の
どちらの手術においても，コミュニケーションの齟齬はエ
ラーと有害転帰の根本原因であると指摘されてお





















































































































































































































































る16, 17, 21-23, 58, 61, 75．これが示しているのは，ノンテクニカ
ルスキルを改善するためのチームワーク訓練を実施すれ
ば，エラーを減らせるはずだということである164, 185．米


























役 軍 人 病 院（Veteranʼs Administration）の Medical























































































































恐れもある212, 213．オランダでは，Dutch Health Care
Inspectorate によって 2008 年までにWHOチェックリ
ストの使用が義務付けられたが，完全な形で実践したのは
全症例 11 151 件中わずか 39%であった．しかし，総死
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図 3 世界保健機関の手術安全チェックリスト（World Health Organization Surgical Safety Checklist）201．IVは静脈ライン













か 4%であった179．同様の現象は，Mayo Clinic の心臓外
科でブリーフィングを導入しようとした際にも認められた
（未発表データ，T. M. S.）．また，3 733例を対象とした
Safe Surgery Checklist Study においても，術前にブ
リーフィングを実施している例はほとんどみられなかっ
た171．




していれば，有害事象の誘因の 3 分の 1 を排除し，死亡
例の約 40% を予防できていた可能性219 が示されている．
そして SURPASS の導入により，合併症の発生率が
27.3% から 16.7% に，院内死亡率が 1.5% から 0.8% に
低下した183．WHO手術安全チェックリストにもブリーフ
ィングに関する多くの領域が含まれており，その導入によ
り死亡率が 1 .5% から 0 .8% まで，合併症の発生率が
11.0% から 7.0% まで低下し，ほぼ同様の結果が得られ


















































































































































































語の使用（アルファの a，ブラボーの b，チャーリーの c
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など）や 1桁の数字を使った数の表現（eleven は seven
と紛らわしいため「one one」と言う，【翻訳者追記：






























































































































26% から 19% まで減少し，集中治療室の看護師の満足




























































Medical Team Training（MTT）や TeamSTEPPS プロ
グラム（米国医療研究品質庁［Healthcare Research














































































































































pational Safety and Health Administration）と国立職業
保安・健康協会（National Institute for Occupational
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図 4 心臓手術室における精神的負荷は，個々の医療従事者が
担う業務の複雑さと責任に応じて手術の過程全体を通じ








































































安 全 文 化








で，全 体 の 傾 向 を つ か む 目 的 で 実 施 さ れ て き




























































































































































































































































































である Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Program
（CUSP）は，安全文化の構築を目指したプログラムであ
り，手術室ではなく集中治療室で検討されてきた390．こ
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Quality Management391, 392，Institute for Healthcare
Improvement Breakthrough Co l laboratives393，







































































けるこのモデルは，1987 年に Northern New England












り，17 の病院と 10 の循環器および胸部外科グループが




ガン胸部・心血管外科学会（Michigan Society of Thora-
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グラムとしては，Alabama Coronary Artery Bypass
Grafting Project，Washington Clinical Outcomes Pro-
gram，California Local/Regional Cardiac Surgery Da-
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表 3 推奨事項の分類とエビデンスレベル
†References 13, 16, 18, 20-23, 58, 59, 72, 76-80.
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§References 296, 304, 310, 311, 314, 316, 317, 321.
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